“The ‘Indian threat’ is what enables the military’s influence and power within Pakistan, the state behind the state, its significant economic influence and budget.”
Too often the United States fails to take into account the unintended consequences of its actions. Don’t get me wrong, the unintended consequences are discussed and debated at national security and principals’ meetings, where most major national security decisions are made, but after we make a decision we forget about the unintended consequences of our actions and, even worse, make few plans for those consequences.
Let’s look no further than Iraq, in which I was a keen direct participant and observer of this phenomenon, and Libya, to see the reality. The consequences of Libya cost us little, other than instability, mass refugee crisis for Europe, and a breeding ground for ISIS, while Iraq’s consequences cost us thousands of dead and wounded Americans, hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqis, billions in expenses and continued war for years to come.
This brings us to Pakistan. Washington and Europe are discussing placing Pakistan back on a global terrorist financing watchlist. This carries no legal implications but can serve to bring extra scrutiny, chill trade and investment, and increase transaction costs. The consequences can hamper Pakistan’s economic recovery, which is expanding at its fastest rate in years.
This would come on the heels of U.S. aid suspension of $2 billion. The goal with all this economic pressure is to bring Pakistan to heel in its support of terrorist groups both in Afghanistan and India, but primarily Afghanistan, which is what we care the most about. There is a chance that this might, in the end, work, and curtail Pakistan’s efforts. I have my doubts, but I have been wrong before.
Pakistan views these groups as instrumental in its efforts to preserve the Pakistani state, instruments of national security. I believe this idea is patently false, brought about by the Pakistani military’s demonization of India from which they can no longer back down. The “Indian threat” is what enables the military’s influence and power within Pakistan, the state behind the state, its significant economic influence and budget. The threat can be solved by rational negotiation with India and a solution to its border dispute, easier said than done, but that solution would have a negative impact on Pakistan’s military. The circle continues.
I’m not saying Pakistan isn’t duplicitous, it is. It supports our campaign in Afghanistan while undermining it at the same time, but frankly most allies are duplicitous to a lesser or greater degree.
This brings us to the title of the article, Unintended Consequences. Despite military success against Pakistani Taliban insurgents and an improving economy, Pakistan remains a fragile state. Its political system is unstable, a weak civilian government with no real authority over the military, a home-grown insurgency, the growing influence of radical Islamic groups, and a nuclear armed military that is likely divided internally over its ties and control of these radical groups. It bears saying again, a nuclear armed military (probably over 100 nuclear weapons and more coming). There will be unintended consequences to our pressure on Pakistan.
I’m not saying Pakistan isn’t duplicitous, it is. It supports our campaign in Afghanistan while undermining it at the same time, but frankly most allies are duplicitous to a lesser or greater degree. After all, all nations have their own national security interests that do not necessarily coincide with our own. Saudi Arabia springs most to mind. Pakistan is simply a stark example of that duplicitousness because of our involvement in Afghanistan. We really didn’t care when they were supporting terrorists who just killed Indians.
Increasing pressure on Pakistan might yield results but we need to be wary that in the end we are not destabilizing the country, that we are not delegitimizing the imperfect institutions that hold the country together. How much can Pakistan’s government and military yield to U.S. pressure before they begin to lose legitimacy? I would argue that they already have lost much legitimacy and it wouldn’t take much to push it over the edge.
The U.S. is already viewed as an unreliable ally by Pakistan, much as we view them. Added U.S. pressure could lead factions inside Pakistan to believe the current policy of supporting U.S. counterterrorism operations, imperfect as that support is, as a losing proposition and encourage them to overturn the current order, installing more extreme elements in the military and government. A more radicalized, anti-U.S., nuclear armed Pakistan would spell serious trouble for U.S. national security, both in South Asia and at home.
An extremist Pakistani state could more readily use nuclear weapons against India, and for those of you who don’t care, don’t forget the nuclear cloud that would head toward the U.S. depending on the wind. An extremist Pakistan could even provide nuclear weapons to terrorist groups to use against the U.S. The commitment of extremists to do harm at all costs should never be underestimated.
I am sure the U.S. has plans in place to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, just as sure as I am that we will fail to secure them all.
This all begs the question, what should we do? We face a Pakistani military deeply committed to extremist groups. In their view, the benefits outweigh the risks. There has been little follow through by the international community in its sanctioning Pakistan for their support. Yet, too much pressure could lead to the collapse of order in Pakistan, leading to ever multiplying problems.
I believe the solution to Pakistan’s support to extremist lies through its troubled relationship with India. Without a solution to this problem there will not be a solution to all the other problems involving Pakistan.
In any event, we should be very concerned about any unintended consequences of our policy to pressure Pakistan and be prepared for worst case scenarios. I am sure the U.S. has plans in place to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, just as sure as I am that we will fail to secure them all. We need to be very careful as we move along our efforts to pressure Pakistan, and pray that the outcome is not worse than our current reality.
