“National security policy is supposed to make the U.S. safer and advance U.S. interests. The question we should ask ourselves is whether the latest move by the U.S. government accomplishes these goals.”
The U.S. decision to stop aid to Pakistan is the culmination of years of frustration with the government there. We have been frustrated by the apparent duplicity of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, its support to Taliban factions while at the same time supporting U.S. forces in Afghanistan, its support for regional terrorist groups while fighting other terrorist groups, and its use as a safe haven for Al Qaida and Taliban leadership.
Until ISIS came along, many of the terrorist attacks throughout the world had some connection to Pakistan. U.S. anger has been building for years. Why can’t Pakistan get on board with U.S. policy, stop providing safe havens for terrorist groups, and help us finish the job? We all know that we cannot win the fight in Afghanistan without eliminating the Taliban safe havens inside Pakistan. The arguments against Pakistan are all too familiar.
In light of all this, cutting aid to Pakistan was a logical conclusion in the minds of many. It made us feel good, a parting shot at the double-crossing Pakistani regime. It might make us feel good in the short term, but the success of foreign policy and national security policy is not based on simply feeling good by poking the other guy in the eye. National security policy is supposed to make the U.S. safer and advance U.S. interests. The question we should ask ourselves is whether the latest move by the U.S. government accomplishes these goals.
It might make us feel good in the short term, but the success of foreign policy and national security policy is not based on simply feeling good by poking the other guy in the eye.
Pakistan has been a mixed bag as an ally. It has all the baggage noted above but it has also accomplished much in support of the U.S. antiterrorism campaign. Pakistan is the major land bridge through which we support the coalition in Afghanistan. Without Pakistan this effort would become more costly and more problematic. Before ISIS, the majority of terrorists apprehended were captured inside Pakistan with the help of Pakistani security forces. Their intelligence sharing has also been very valuable. Drone operations over the skies of Pakistan have also been useful intelligence gathering tools. Pakistan has also suffered significant casualties in its fight against its own home-grown Taliban and support for U.S. military efforts has caused much unrest within Pakistan.
None of this excuses Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups. When I was sitting in India I was frequently frustrated by Pakistan’s support for anti-Indian terrorist groups and the bloody attacks they carried out against that country. But the point here is that this is a complex story and resolving it cannot be driven by emotion.
Will this move stop Pakistan from supporting select terrorist groups? I would argue no. To begin with, we have put Pakistan in a difficult position by making such a public issue of stopping aid. The government of Pakistan now cannot back down in this face off with the U.S. for fear of alienating the various power groups within the country, leading to political instability in a country that is already unstable. They cannot be seen caving in to U.S. pressure. We have merely hardened Pakistan’s resolve.
We have likely driven Pakistan even closer to China, weakening our position in the region and favoring that of China. China’s footprint in South Asia will grow, leading to more instability in the subcontinent. This will allow China to outflank India and increase its presence in the Indian Ocean.
Too often the US views the South Asia problem as a straightforward issue. We are fighting a war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and various terrorist groups. Our efforts are focused on accomplishing that mission. We believe our allies, such as Pakistan, should also be focused on achieving the same goals. The region, however, does not see it that way and until we seriously factor regional issues into our calculation we will never solve the problem. It is all interconnected.
We have likely driven Pakistan even closer to China, weakening our position in the region and favoring that of China.
Pakistan views India as its mortal enemy. All Pakistani policy is subordinated to this issue. The Pakistani military, which are the de facto rulers of Pakistan, view things through this prism. The military’s power and influence stems from the perceived threat from India, its relatively large budget and political control stems from the idea that India is trying to destabilize Pakistan and that without a strong military Pakistan would crumble before India’s might. It is true that India far outweighs Pakistan in terms of military and economic power, as well as population and land mass.
Afghanistan provides Pakistan with a safe backdoor and strategic depth, assuming the Afghan government is aligned with Pakistan, such as the Taliban. Afghanistan can also be a major threat in its rear if Indian influence grows in Afghanistan. That is why Pakistan supports groups inimical to U.S. interests, but which are seen to support Pakistan’s objectives and are inherently anti-Indian.
India would rather not have to worry about Pakistan. The nation is on the march towards being a major regional military power and world economic powerhouse, it could care less about a border dispute with Pakistan, except for the fact that Pakistan keeps launching terrorist attacks and cross border skirmishes against it. Geopolitically, India is more concerned with China as a regional competitor. If China moves into Pakistan in a bigger way, India will become more concerned with Pakistan as it will see itself as being slowly surrounded by Chinese power. Regional instability will increase.
This gets us back to the original point. Is halting aid to Pakistan going to accomplish anything other than making us feel good for the short term? From the looks of things, no. Cutting aid will accomplish little for U.S. national security while continuing the quagmire in Afghanistan. We will be increasing instability in the region and not lessening Pakistan’s support for extremist groups. We need a wider approach to this issue, one that leans heavily on diplomacy and economics, while focusing on solving the issues that plague South Asia. We need an approach that works to solve Pakistan’s security concerns, as well as India’s, while keeping Chinese expansionism at bay.
