It seems like every week there is a similar debate, and this week featured an article asking if the carrier was still relevant. But I felt the article writer’s analysis missed several key points. The author focuses on “ominous” implications of new and fancy missiles from China, and the possible use of drones, but does not realize the difference between game-changing technology and the newest version of old technology. This is especially egregious considering the author cited modern strategist Luttwak in his piece. Many technologies sound good, but the nation with those technologies may not have the ability to use them in combat, and it fails to take into account the sophisticated defenses developed against them. Finally, the carrier has many important non-combat functions and logistical roles that enhance its use.
The author points to some new advanced missiles from China. But it remains to be seen if China can use these weapons in combat conditions. China fought its last active war in 1979. There are few (if any) officers and military members that have experience operating in war-time conditions. Training exercises are important, and China has many of them, but there is little that can replace the skills gained from war-time experience. Chinese fighter pilots, for example, often go through very basic training exercises and have trouble showing initiative. War-time conditions include a great deal of stress, confusion, unexpected events and a limited time in which to make decisions. An untested military using untested technology means their missile threat may be one of the many militaries around the world that look and sound good on paper as they promise the “mother of all battles,” only to melt away when the conflict starts. Assuming Chinese forces skillfully use their new missiles, these are a high-use and rapidly depleted weapon. In this case it means China would have a strong first punch but little staying power once the missiles run out.
But there is a good chance that the United States can defend against that strong first punch. Chinese missiles are simply the newest versions of technology that has been around for 70 years. London had to worry about Hitler’s vengeance rockets but the U.S. has sophisticated defenses against them. The author gave the radius a plan can fly as limits of those defenses, but not the range of the sensors and missiles on those planes. The F-35 has been networked with older planes, the first line of defense against missiles, to extend their range “beyond the horizon.” The F-35s can also be networked with Aegis destroyers, the next line of defense, to extend their sensors as well. Aegis destroyers having their radar refitted make them 35 times more powerful. The U.S. is also testing new advanced rail guns that consist of the final layer of defense against missiles, and they are trying to repurpose artillery to fire anti-missile shells. So in short, every layer of defense against missiles has been extended and improved and they are increasingly able to destroy missiles before they get near the carrier, which suggests that these missiles are not changing the game.
On top of engaging missiles a long distance, the U.S. has their own ability to launch missiles and destroy Chinese batteries. The Ohio-class submarine, for example, was originally designed as a platform for nuclear missiles but it’s been refitted to fire Tomahawk land-attack missiles. They carry as many as 154 missiles and, given the typical composition of a carrier strike group and the need to defend against Chinese missiles, the Ohio-class might have more Tomahawks than all the other ships combined! The original missions as a nuclear sub means the ship produces a small signature even when firing the missiles, and it quickly disappears from radar thereafter. The combination of stealth and rate of fire means that a single submarine can close within a short distance of enemy targets and launch its full complement of missiles in six minutes. Not even including the many missiles that can be launched from land, ship, and air-based platforms, the U.S. Navy contains ships which have the potential to significantly degrade the threat of Chinese missiles in minutes!
The author correctly points out that carriers have not been in a high intensity fight since 1944. In recent modern wars, such as the 1971 Indian-Pakistan War, those carriers were cautiously used, and in the 1982 Falkland’s war they were held far back from the islands to prevent strikes from Argentine forces. And the author says that this was before the era of precision-guided munitions which implies that the current threat is even worse. But he overstates that factor by leaping from cautiously used all the way to being irrelevant, and he fails to note the increases in anti-missile and interceptor technology. Assuming for the sake of argument that the carriers are held back, new carrier- based fighters like the F-35 and missiles have extended range, that means they can still affect the conflict.
There are some real dangers to a carrier, but they are hardly “symbolic” forces. There are significant questions concerning the ability of China to integrate and implement their new systems in war-time conditions. The United States has significant and upgraded assets that can defend against and reduce these threats. The carriers also have significant logistical functions that make them vital for non-combat roles. Missiles can be dangerous, but the Chinese ones have not made the carrier obsolete.
