Often the grind and grone of diplomacy can become a bit ironic. On 26 October, Pakistani media reported that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, former deputy head of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, had been released from custody. Baradar had been under “protective custody” in Pakistan ever since being captured in 2010 in a joint raid by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and the CIA in Karachi.
In a statement released on Voice of Jihad, the official website of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban described Baradar as “the former deputy leader of Islamic Emirate, his excellency,” and hailed his being “released from prison after spending nine years in Pakistani detention.”
What was interesting to note about Baradar’s release is that it was allegedly requested by the U.S. Department of State. According to reports, State Department officials told media sources that “founding Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar’s release is the fulfilment of a long-standing Kabul demand.”
This comes as an interesting twist in light of the rising tensions between the United States and Pakistan over the past year. The Trump administration has for long been railing against Islamabad for not doing enough to mitigate the expanse of militancy in its region—not to mention regularly assisting extremist groups. Earlier this year, President Trump cut the annual $255 million in military aid it provides Pakistan. Explaining his decision Trump tweeted that the U.S. will no longer grant military funding to Pakistan as its leaders have received “billions of dollars in aid over the past fifteen years” and have repaid the United States with only “lies and deceit.”
The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!
— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 1, 2018
Now the United States has requested from Pakistan to release a terrorist overlord. And it’s all part of the administration’s new diplomatic plan for the region.
The U.S. has for the last several months been trying talking as opposed to shooting in order to solve the Afghanistan problem. Back in July, Trump ordered the State Department to seek out direct communications with the Taliban. The efforts of State culminated recently in a face-to-face sit down between Taliban representatives and American negotiators in Doha. The Taliban even admitted the meeting took place, confirming the plan for more meetings in the future. The release of Baradar is part of this give-and-take process America is hoping to initiate with the Taliban.
But in addition to a mere gesture of goodwill, Baradar’s freedom was also meant to kickstart the negotiations themselves. Washington officials quoted by Pakistani media stated that the U.S. asked for the Mullah’s release in order to “help facilitate a peace process.” In other words, Washington is hoping that Baradar now re-entering the picture will bring a supportive voice to the delicate diplomacy that has already begun.
It is very important to understand the administration’s mindset here:
Baradar comes from a bygone era of Taliban leadership, having been the deputy of former Taliban head Mohammed Omar himself. This was a generation of leaders that had been prepared to talk to the Americans. Let us not forget, it was Baradar’s colleagues that had been prepared—at least in theory—to hand over Osama bin Laden in the opening months of the war and made solid attempts to prevent the conflict from escalating. This is not to whitewash the Taliban’s role. In the end, Omar’s government refused to cooperate with the U.S. and granted refuge to bin Laden. The point is, this was a generation of Taliban officials that were at least open to talking. America’s plan is that Baradar can in some way revive that sentiment within the current Taliban leadership.
Unfortunately, from a realistic perspective, it will be difficult for Baradar to influence the situation to America’s benefit—even if he wants to. The Taliban today is arguably a lot more radical than it ever was. To give some perspective, consider Mullah Haibatullah, the Taliban’s current leader, who was once the the group’s top judicial authority. In that position, he provided the religious justification for the more radical tactics of the Taliban’s military operations, including its use of suicide bombers. Haibatullah’s own son killed himself in a suicide attack with his father’s approval. He was also the one to sanction the Taliban’s cooperation with al-Qaeda. Today’s leaders are hardly the type to be offering concessions.
In all likelihood, America will need more than a retired moderate to push their negotiations forward.
