“ISIS’ elevated profile on a worldwide stage has been built through reliance on a loosely defined network of apprentices.”
As the latest example of terror in the western world, in the aftermath of the Manchester attacks, there is the usual rush to brand the attack to ISIS. But focusing on a single moniker diminishes the larger ideological threat to freedom. For it was al-Qaeda that started this thing we know as the war on terror. And, with Hamza bin Laden’s recent comments it looks as though the heir to the bin Laden legacy intends for that group to reemerge on a global stage.
Will the rise of young Hamza signal a turf war for jihadist supremacy? His name alone instills nostalgia in the hearts of these evil losers that, combined with his charisma—which Osama’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri is sorely lacking—suggest that al-Qaeda is poised for a comeback. That is, a comeback on a public stage, as Hamza has long been on intelligence services’ radar. During its lull in exposure, al-Qaeda has given way to ISIS. As such, the bar for terrorism and evil has been elevated.
There are two key reasons this current standard-bearer for Islamic extremism is named other than al-Qaeda. The first is a pursuit of and adherence to more barbaric rules of engagement than al-Qaeda supports. The second is more significant in our efforts to thwart and defeat the West’s most determined enemy. ISIS’ elevated profile on a worldwide stage has been built through reliance on a loosely defined network of apprentices. No additional direction or coordination is required. This unorganized organization is what has elevated ISIS from being a regionally contained threat to a worldwide conglomerate whose terror is acted upon wherever a sympathetic ally resides.
With little focus on an established protocol, ISIS further separates itself from the familiar al-Qaeda standard operating procedure whereby there is a chain of command for identifying an attack’s target and determining its method of execution. The Manchester attacks may prove to be yet another example of this.
Under Osama bin Laden and continued by Zawahiri, al-Qaeda operated by focusing efforts against targets they believe Muslims around world who feel oppressed can rally behind: symbols of western supremacy like financial institutions and military interests. For them, the focus was primarily on the quality of a target to get the biggest bang for their buck. As a result, a successful attack would take time and require concurrence by someone in the hierarchy. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the ISIS leader, instead rules with a divide-and-conquer mindset that charges its unseen supporters with going forth and multiplying.
Coordination and sign-off is not a requirement so long as the attack advances ISIS’ footprint and increases exposure. What we are seeing unfold is a focus on quantity that ISIS uses to prove its quality as a caliphate. By way of frequency, the group is looking to create the new normal in western societies. They will continue to do so as they build wins by playing “money ball,” focusing their bats on singles and doubles and not just September 11-style home runs.
They do so through attacks that do not have a defined signature, which is in fact their signature. Disparate targets and tactics are the bedrock for success and also the key inhibitor to targeting and disrupting the threats. For the intelligence community, lack of a defined chain of command means lack of choke points to home in on for insight. Consider that despite its size, it is estimated that our intelligence community sees less than 10 percent of terrorist activity. And without the choke points, telegraphing the origin and target of the next ISIS attack is made that much more difficult.
So what can we expect from al-Qaeda 2.0 under Osama’s son? Even if he serves as a public figurehead with Zawahiri strategizing in the shadows, will ISIS’ success and template for spreading evil force the group that started it all to adapt to a higher grade of savagery? Will Hamza adapt to a looser management style? Or will the two groups operate as two distinct brands so as to provide the jihadi marketplace shoppers with options? The bigger and more important questions to the western world should be does it matter and what are we going to do about it?
