The U.S. Army recently released a critical history of the Iraq War which has inspired the usual debates, gloating, and talking points. The recently rekindled debate actually mirrors how history is useful but also ripe for abuse.
The U.S. military should look at lessons in the Iraq War. It went through several phases from an active conflict to insurgency, and Iraq changed from a chaotic interim government to civil war and then to near collapse in the last 15 years. This release is an important collection and analyses of primary documents.
The problems stem from the hot takes from the pundits who mainly see what they want to see, and see what supports their assertions. And this is the problem with history. It’s not that it is forgotten and that we are doomed to repeat it, but that people selectively use it to support what they want.
This is most clearly seen in the two most famous wars in American history. World War II is seen as the quintessential good war. It was a traditional war fought against a clearly evil enemy. The war ended in dramatic signing ceremonies and the troops came home. Vietnam is the typical bad war. The insurgency seemed never-ending and morally questionable to some. The soldiers came home to domestic turmoil in what seemed more like a negotiated peace than a victory.
Even though the specific conditions of the wars will never be replicated, each is repeatedly invoked by politicians who either support or oppose intervention. Pro-interventionists cite the Hitler-like evil that needs to be confronted and not appeased, while opponents cite Vietnam-era terms like quagmire or escalations.
In this case, we are seeing a new language develop where people who oppose the war cite a new quagmire in Iraq and short-sighted leaders. But, like I said about Tucker Carlson, there is a lazy comfort in 20/20 hindsight that doesn’t adequately account for the myriad decisions, each with portentous consequences that had to be made in the moment. Nor do they account for what was prevented by Bush’s preemptive actions. Instead, they look at the matter 15 years later and declare that anybody who disagrees with their hindsight is foolish.
So, yes, this is an important digest of mistakes made, but it also picks out pieces of intel among thousands, and single decisions among many —such as failing to note the rise of ISIS in 2004— that are only recognizable 15 years later, and which simply becomes a mascot for predetermined talking points of pundits and politicians.
