On 8 May 2018, President Trump’s decision to remove the United States from JCPOA, or the Iran nuclear deal, was an incredibly consequential move. The pull-out was yet another powerful factor added to an already volatile situation, evolving around the epicenter of the Syrian Civil War.
There are several important issues that are now being negotiated in the fallout from America’s reneging on JCPOA. These elements are all very much tied together. Collectively, they will strongly determine the course of the chaotic multifaceted conflict taking place in the region, especially in terms of the escalating tensions between Iran and Israel.
1. Iran’s Containment Diplomacy
It is important to understand that JCPOA was far from a reluctant compromise for Iran. In fact it was a rather sweet deal for the Islamic Republic. This was mostly because the terms of the final draft were very much in Iran’s favor. In addition to relieving the country of international sanctions, Iran also got to enjoy a perception of “playing ball” with the international community and not just the pirya, terror promoting state that it actually is, and has been for over thirty years. Iran did not want anything to break this delicate and highly beneficial set of circumstances. This was made clear on several occasions by top Iranian diplomats. Last October, for instance, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif went so far as to say that Iran would continue to abide by the deal even if the US rescinded completely.
Since the the US pull-out, Iran’s leadership has been scrambling to insure the deal will stay intact despite America’s absence. In a state television statement, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told listeners that despite Trump’s decision to leave represented a “violation of morals,” the Islamic Republic remains committed to the JCPOA. “If the remaining five countries continue to abide by the agreement, Iran will remain in the deal despite the will of America,” he said. On 12 March, Foreign Minister Zarif began a tour of other signatory countries to ensure the deal remains binding. Zarif first flew to Beijing where he met Chinese counterpart Minister Wang Yi. “China is willing to maintain communication and coordination with all relevant parties, including Iran, and take an objective, fair and responsible attitude to continue to safeguard the…agreement,” Wang said. The following day, Zarif traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. According to Russian state media agency TASS, the two were expected to discuss the “possibility of preserving the Iran nuclear deal.” Moscow has previously stated its strong support for the agreement.
As evident from the above statements, the expectations of these countries as to the deal’s future remains a bit ambiguous. While many countries like China and Russia are eager to preserve JCPOA, realistically there are some very serious obstacles opposing that.
The US administration seems rather adamant on reimposing the sanctions Obama’s Iran deal did away with. Some members of Trump’s cabinet even suggested sanctions on European companies that maintain business dealings with Iran were possible. For its part, Iran is only willing to continue abiding by the deal if it remains protected from such sanctions. While American leadership has made clear it seeks to establish an alternative deal—a message Trump already included in his May 8 announcement—it is highly improbable the Iranians are willing to start from scratch on a brand new deal. This is not just because they don’t want to be toyed with by the United States. But also because any deal from the Trump administration would include restrictions on their military build up and regional activities. The whole appeal JCPOA had for Iran was that the deal allowed the regime to continue with those activities unmitigated. European nations that are parties to the deal such as France, Britain, and Germany, would love to see JCPOA survive, but realize they have little control over American policy. All of this is underscored by Trump’s increasing willingness to implement sanctions as a foreign policy tool. Trump not only stated his intent to reintroduce the original sanctions on Iran, but also added new bans relating to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The fact that all of this is transpring in the wake of Trump’s sweeping sanctions on Russian companies in retaliation for meddling in the 2016 elections, also drives home this point.
2. Israel’s Wrath
In recent years of the Syrian conflict, Israel has shown itself willing, while perhaps reluctant, to execute strikes on the country. Over the past two months however there has been a clear escalation in Israel’s military actions against targets to its north. This trend began in early February when, in response to an Iranian drone infiltrating Israel, the country’s air force targeted the craft’s base of origin at the Tiyas Military Airbase in Homs.
The operation that consisted of two waves of strikes hit a total of 12 targets and resulted in some 25 Syrians and Iranians dead, as well as one Israeli fighter shot down. Two weeks ago, another strike hit Syria’s Hama province. The resulting blast registered 2.6 on the Richter scale indicating that the target was highly explosive. It was later reported that a missile depot was destroyed in the attack and some two dozen Iranians killed.
Then came the May 10 airstrikes, launched in response to rocket fire on Israel’s north by IRGC units. The scale of these attacks was greater than any Israeli military operation in recent history. Some 50 separate sites were hit over the course of several hours, including logistics complexes, weapons storage sites belonging to Damascus International Airport, intelligence systems, as well as observation posts and military hardware installations. According to the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 11 Iranians were among the 46 killed in Israel’s strikes.
Israel has certainly taken a more aggressive stance. Judging from statements of its leaders, Israel seems prepared to go all the way. And Iran knows it.
Iran’s current situation is precarious not because it lacks retaliatory options (far from it) but because it has little room to maneuver without suffering serious backlash.
As one Israeli commentator has smartly pointed out, Iran’s establishing itself into Syria, while projecting its power and increasing the threat it poses to Israel, has proved to be a huge strategic liability. During the long history of the Israeli-Iranian proxy war, the two countries all the while remained distant. By making inroads into Syria, Iran began to expose its assets to the neighboring Israel. Supply convoys, IRGC bases, and weapons systems were now within strategic range of the Israeli air force.
This was the real reason why Israeli air strikes in February were such a big deal. While Iran and Israel have been in conflict for years, the strikes on Homs marked the first time Israel and Iran actually clashed directly. This incident and all the other strikes over the past two months showed that if Iran were to escalate, it would put the rest of its assets in the country at tremendous risk.
Furthermore, Iran cannot rely on its partners in Syria to intervene. Putin has given a free hand to Israel to target Iranian sites. This is because, from Moscow’s perspective, the only thing that really matters is keeping Assad’s regime intact. Indeed, this was the reason Russia offered its game changing support to the Syrian government to begin with, and is an interest of Putin’s that would actually be threatened by Iran upping the ante with Israel. Turkey as well, while not being particularly fond of Israel, is primarily interested in de-escalating the fighting to its south.
3. Other Players in the Region
Finally, the third element that will influence how the situation evolves encompasses the other players in the region.
Many of these countries are not friends of Israel. Some have been officially at war with the Jewish State since its inception 70 years ago. But many are deeply pragmatic, at least when it comes to recognizing Iran’s regional expansion.
This is truly a subject that doesn’t get enough coverage in the discussion of the Syrian conflict. Sunni countries from Qatar, to Bahrain, to Saudi Arabia are all deeply worried about the Shiite Iran spreading its influence. This includes the Revolutionary Guards setting up shop in Syria as well as the development of hordes of Badr militia in Iraq.
Perusing the response of the Arab world to Israeli strikes in Syria, there are clear condemnations of Iran and even hopes that Israel will have continued success in pushing back Tehran’s incursions in the Middle East.
With any luck, these constraints on Iran’s options will prevent the Iran-Israel clash in Syria from intensifying any further. It’s in no one’s interest that this exchange escalates. The best thing that we can hope for is that Iran will cut its losses and focus on conservatively regrouping following the blow to the international nuclear deal which it values so much.
