Robert Kaplan wrote in the Washington Post that Trump’s “aggressive economic nationalism” undermines his stance in the South China Sea. His analysis showed how important the South China Sea is in international trade, but ignored many details that undercut his thesis. In particular, a dominant aggressive China in the South China Sea has the potential to create a string of alliances that contains them. Those countries might be smaller, but Vietnam in particular has advantages that Kaplan completely ignores.
Kaplan is correct that China is a growing power and their military dwarfs their neighbors, but those neighbors are beginning to challenge China’s supremacy and they could form a block that surrounds and contains China. The danger comes from being in a situation similar to Germany’s prior to World War I, in that a Chinese fear of being surrounded could create an unstable doomsday machine of alliances and counter-alliances that plunge the world into war.
Before World War I, Germany constantly worried about encirclement. As a result, they aggressively pursued their interests with their neighbors around them. But it often backfired. The First and Second Moroccan Crises sparked international outrage and led to a strengthening of the bonds between Britain and France against Germany.
The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 destabilized Eastern Europe and made Russia even more interested in supporting its remaining ally in the region against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Germany began to maneuver in an effort to avoid entrapment—this resulted in a strengthening of alliances against them. It was what Henry Kissinger called a doomsday machine that plunged the world into catastrophic warfare.
China claims they are addressing their rights and defending their sovereignty. But they are doing so by aggressively disputing land and maritime territories with most of their neighbors, including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, India, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Much like Germany before World War I, these actions end up being counterproductive.
South Korea resisted Chinese pressure and allowed America to deploy Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missiles. These missiles are a key defensive weapon system against China’s preferred strategy: overwhelming amounts of missiles to deny access or destroy American forces. India had a tense ten-week standoff during the summer in a critical strategic area connecting mainland India to its North Eastern states, but it was the Chinese that backed down.
Disputes over the Senkaku Islands have caused the Japanese population to coalesce in favor of a stiff response. Vietnam is specifically building forces meant to counter Chinese strength and is actively seeking allies that face the same threats from China, including India, Japan, and even the U.S. An American aircraft carrier recently visited the country, which represents a shift in Vietnamese relations.
Kaplan mentions Vietnam in particular, so it’s worth looking at their military in closer detail. Vietnam’s navy is much smaller than China’s, but they have versatile, capable, and fast corvettes and frigates that operate as vital missile platforms. The frigates in particular are good at engaging other ships and aircraft, as well as hunting submarines. Vietnam’s focus on small ships and having frigates as the backbone of the navy suggests that Vietnam is not looking for large-scale naval battles and confrontations with battleships. Rather, they seek to perform small operations and contest Chinese actions that are on the lower end of the conflict spectrum.
Both powers have the Kilo-class Russian submarines. But analysts say that Vietnam’s may be more advanced. Moreover, the Vietnamese naval base is quite protected in Southern Vietnam, past a shooting gallery of land-based assets and sophisticated defensive systems. The Chinese have not developed anti-submarine capabilities and their main port in Southern China, located in Hainan Province, is quite within the range of Vietnamese submarines.
Kaplan seems to be spending more time obsessing over Trump’s Twitter feed, and repeating talking points about his mercurial nature. A close critique of his major points finds that American naval policy in East Asia is strong, and that it is stronger because of Chinese provocation and steady aggression against each of their neighbors.
