“Investigators concluded that Nayeb brought the vest into work and then spent about four months weaponizing it, using tools and parts that were available in the vehicle yard.”
The main entrance to Bagram Airfield, one of the biggest American bases in Afghanistan, is guarded by Afghan soldiers who secure the road to Bagram Airfield’s main gate. Bagram is located north of Kabul, Afghanistan. On November 12, 2016, as troops gathered for the annual 5K Veterans Day race (a race I ran in three years earlier), an Afghan worker detonated a suicide vest, killing five and wounding 16.
Sgt. John Perry, 30, and Pfc. Tyler Iubelt, 20, were killed and Sgt 1st Class Allen E. Brown succumbed to his wounds on Dec. 7, 2016 at Walter Reed National Medical Center, where he had been hospitalized since the attack.
The Afghan worker had spent four months constructing his suicide vest in his work location on the base. Ahmad Nayeb killed himself, three American soldiers, and two civilian contractors while injuring 16 more American soldiers and one Polish soldier, according to a US Forces-Afghanistan investigation.
No one had informed Bagram’s counterintelligence division that there was a former insurgent working at the non-tactical vehicle yard.
Nayeb was a former Taliban insurgent hired by a contractor in 2011 to work in Bagram’s non-tactical vehicle yard. “Former” appears now to be a misnomer. He detonated the bomb as base personnel were gathering for the 5K fun run before dawn.
“Though the ultimate target for the attack remains indeterminable, the group of soldiers and Fluor employees unwittingly induced the assailant to detonate his suicide vest, likely preventing a far greater tragedy,” Maj. Gen. Thomas James, the investigating officer, wrote in his remarks.
Lack of Security Procedures
Alliance Project Services, Inc., a subcontractor to Virginia-based Fluor Corp., followed proper security procedures when hiring Nayeb, but the contractor did not take accountability for local national employees in terms of supervision or job performance. There was a “pervasive ‘culture of complacency’ and indiscipline—specifically within the civilian portions of the base—that permeated the forward operating base,” General James wrote.
Nayeb, a supposed former Taliban insurgent, had completed the required Afghanistan Peace and Integration Program in order to work on Bagram. He also had three of his cousins working on the base.
Afghanistan Peace and Re-Integration Program
The following statement is taken from the Afghanistan Peace and Re-Integration Program (APRP) report from 2011. The paragraph here is telling, as nothing seems to have changed—these are the same problems General James found on Bagram itself.
The Afghan worker had spent four months constructing his suicide vest in his work location on the base.
In addition to the deteriorating security situation and the consequent restrictions on movement and operations, APRP faced certain other challenges. These issues include a lack of capacity in some implementing partners, difficulty in identifying hard-core insurgents, inadequate development programs after the initial 90-day transition assistance, and inadequate monitoring capacity.
Missed Chances
No one had informed Bagram’s counterintelligence division that there was a former insurgent working at the non-tactical vehicle yard. Further, it was found that Fluor did not escort local national employees from the front security gate, where they were searched, before each shift to their assigned workplaces and did not ensure that they left after every shift.
Nayeb had a reputation for slacking off and going missing for long stretches. “No formal counseling or disciplinary action can be found for Nayeb despite reported instances of sleeping at work and absences without authority,” James wrote. There was confusion among contracting management concerning who was supposed to be supervising him, he added.
According to the investigation, Nayeb also checked out multiple tools that were not associated with his vehicle maintenance job, and there were no regulations about restricted access to them. The investigation found that he checked out a multimeter nine times, for up to six hours at a time. A multimeter is an essential tool in the construction of explosive devices that are electrically triggered. The device measures voltage, current, and resistance.
Investigators concluded that Nayeb brought the vest into work and then spent about four months weaponizing it, using tools and parts that were available in the vehicle yard. He likely smuggled small bits of homemade explosives in his pockets, disguising them in containers that would not have alerted base security, according to the report.
This part of the report I find puzzling. When I was stationed at FOB Sharana, a forward operating base supported by Bagram, every civilian worker that entered the FOB was searched—scanned by the same type of scanners the TSA makes you stand in when taking a flight. Once through those, they had to pass by our explosive detection canines. If Nayeb had been subjected to the same procedures we used at FOB Sharana, this attack likely would not have happened.
Adjusting Posture
In General James’s report, the emergency and mass casualty response by base security and medical personnel, as well as the commander’s ability to keep the situation as organized as possible after the detonation, was praised.
But the general’s report also addressed what he found as many areas lacking. Bagram needed to better organize its security and counterintelligence efforts. There was little coordination with contractors to provide more oversight of their employees.
Bagram’s security forces are made up of separate multinational uniformed personnel and contractors, and both are understaffed for the amount of work they must do. Mission command and intelligence operations also need streamlining and better communication, he said, on top of disjointed force protection and anti-terrorism structure.
When I was at Bagram as a security contractor, we were consistently understaffed, so this part of the report rings true to me. During the three years I was working dogs looking for explosives and security threats, the base was repeatedly attacked from outside and from within. We found hidden explosives in local workers’ rooms. One night the generators not more than a couple hundred feet from our compound exploded, knocking out power to a large section of the base. This was also found to be an inside job. All in all, I observed the same symptoms of complacency that are discussed here some four years later.
There were local workers who had little or no supervision. Afghan soldiers turned their weapons on US forces, known as despicable green on blue attacks. As for security, if you were not inside a strictly US compound, there was very little.
Bagram has repeatedly been the location of these insider attacks. The US needs to get serious about our people’s security and supply them with the means and trusted personnel to protect them and stop turning a blind eye to a problem that is so easy to see. Ignoring it should be deemed criminal.
