Author Dave Majumdar wrote that the combination of long-range missiles and deadly fighters could defeat America in the next war. I find that the author’s assertion fails to point out historical examples of broad technologies, American defenses, and the limitations of the J-20.
In his book Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Edward Luttwak discussed the difference between narrowly focused and highly specialized technologies and broadly focused expensive technologies. Luttwak described how torpedo boats were incredibly small and cost-effective attempts to negate the advantages of large battleships. The latter had difficulty lowering their large-caliber guns to attack torpedo boats, and their armor was mainly applied to the upper decks to fight other battleships. Yet by 1914, battleships had made basic but important changes to circumvent this threat. They added small-caliber guns, searchlights, and even had torpedo boat destroyers as escorts to fend off this threat.
In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the anti-tank missile seemed to make the tank obsolete. Just like the battleship, it seemed that an inexpensive and easy to use technology would negate a broad and expensive one. Yet, the Israeli tanks were caught by surprise, operating without infantry escort. As soon as these rarities no longer existed, the tanks resumed their role as king of a land-based army.
Chinese missiles are simply the newest versions of technology that has been around for 70 years. London had to worry about Hitler’s vengeance rockets but the U.S. has sophisticated defenses against them developed since that time. The first line of defense is the combat air patrol (CAP). The F-35 has been networked with older planes, the first line of defense against missiles, to extend their range “beyond the horizon.” The F-35s can also be networked with Aegis destroyers, the next line of defense, to extend their sensors as well. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers finished refitting their radar to be 30 times more powerful. So the range at which the first two lines of defense against missiles have been extended and improved, and they are increasingly able to destroy missiles before they get near the carrier.
Lockheed Martin continues to receive criticism over production delays and cost overruns of the F-35, but their anti-ballistic missile program is receiving high marks. They are developing land-based missile batteries and improvements on Aegis ships that can intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles such as the ones that North Korea has launched towards Japan, the kind that Russia fields in Eastern Europe, and definitely the supposed “carrier killing” missiles introduced by China.
On top of engaging missiles a long distance, the U.S. has their own ability to launch missiles and destroy Chinese batteries. The Ohio-class submarine, for example, was originally designed as a platform for nuclear missiles but it’s been refitted to fire Tomahawk land-attack missiles. They carry as many as 154 missiles and given the typical composition of a carrier strike group and the need to defend against Chinese missiles, the Ohio-class subs might have more Tomahawks than all the other ships combined! The original missions as a nuclear sub means the ship produces a small signature even when firing the missiles, and it quickly disappears from radar thereafter. The combination of stealth and rate of fire means that a single submarine can close within a short distance of enemy targets and launch its full complement of missiles in six minutes. Not even including the many missiles that can be launched from land, ship, and air-based platforms, the U.S. Navy contains ships which have the potential to significantly degrade the threat of Chinese missiles in minutes!
The final layer of defense is the close-in weapon systems of ships, and these are being upgraded as well. The U.S. Navy plans to fire new high-speed rail guns at the same time the Chinese South Sea Fleet is adding a submarine squadron to its operations. The new developments show the response and counter-response of ratcheting tension between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, but also show that the U.S. retains a commanding position in that contest.
The Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) can travel at speeds up to 2,000 meters per second when fired from a Rail Gun, a speed which is about three times that of most existing weapons. According to the future Naval Capability Program, “The rate of fire is 10-rounds per minute. Also, due to its ability to reach speeds of up to 5,600 miles per hour, the hypervelocity projectile is engineered as a kinetic energy warhead, meaning no explosives are necessary.”
The final result is a new smart projectile that can be fired faster, with more accuracy, and at longer ranges than current weapons. The missiles can be used for both offensive and defensive missions including countering drones and missiles, and striking other ships and land based targets such as radar stations, airfields, and missile batteries. This gives American commanders another option to counter such new dangers as missile or drone swarms. And it can also add firepower to any first strike option for a near-nuclear North Korea.
This technology builds upon existing anti-missile weapons that naval ships have had since the 1970s. The current technology has a shorter range of only 15 miles, and it can’t specifically target, so the gunners have to use large amounts of ammunition to cover the general area in which the missile is approaching. The new rail gun technology, like the nets and search lights added to battleships to counter new torpedo boats, shows that supposed game- changing technology is often little more than something that requires modest adaptation to existing technology.
Moreover, reports are emerging that the United States is acquiring missiles that puts the shoe on the other foot. The philosophy behind the design of what’s called the Naval Strike Missile was to create a subsonic, small, agile missile that would be hard to observe, as opposed to a larger, supersonic missile. Russian supersonic missiles use active radar in their terminal phase, but the strike missile uses passive infrared (IR) to home in on its target, and it has the ability to hit pinpoint areas of the ships it is targeting. Combined with its small size, this makes the missile harder to track and able to fly low.
The missile itself is incredibly portable. Norway puts them on small corvettes for coastal defense, and the Polish mount them on the back of trucks. American forces can use this with the F-35. The fighter’s sensors are designed to identify and track targets beyond the horizon. The current over-the-horizon missile, the Harpoon, is being phased out, and the Naval Strike Missile is entering testing. With minor modifications it can fit in the internal launch bay. This internal launch bay is important because it preserves the F-35’s stealth signature, and helps the notorious gas guzzler maintain top speed and fuel efficiency.
In addition to having tested and upgraded missile defense systems, the platform that will aid in the launch of these missiles is questionable. But the J-20 is not using its designed jet engine. The process is clouded in secrecy, but reports indicate that the troubles started in 2015 when its original engine exploded. Analysts attribute this to the inability of China to produce a device that can handle the sustained, extreme heat of jet propulsion. As a result, the J-20 now uses the engine used in China’s older fighters, such as the J-10 and J-11, which entered service almost 20 years ago.
The mismatched instrument produces several problems. The lack of seamless fit in the body of the plane increases its signature and decreases its stealth capability. The J-20 also has to turn on its after-burners to reach and cruise at supersonic speed. This erodes its stealth capabilities even more, after burning to reach its top speed consumes fuel at greater rates, which limits its operational range. The F-35 is a notorious gas-guzzling plane as well, but the U.S. compensates for this by having a fleet of air-refueling planes. The Chinese have not yet developed similar capability. If the Chinese used this fighter over contested territory in the South China Sea, for example, it would have very limited time in theater before returning to the mainland to refuel.
The other option is to fire its missiles at subsonic speed. But this would decrease the speed of the plane, and the striking range of the missiles. Again, the advantage of the F-35 is its speed and long-range sensors that allow it to target and engage targets from beyond the horizon. The Chinese lack of supersonic cruising speed, sensors, and stealth capability limit their ability to do the same, despite their claim that they are fielding a fifth-generation fighter.
Analysts conclude that the new engines designed for the fighter won’t be available until 2020. Even then, as those who follow the many delays of the F-35 know, they will still have to work out the numerous kinks and issues with the advanced plane. This becomes an excellent example of the need to identify and prepare for new Chinese technology, but to also avoid overhyping these threats as many technologies have problems and every technology has a counter- measure.
The author provides many “scary details” but omits many key elements and facts that make the entire picture far less stormy. The Chinese are producing new missiles on advanced fighter jets. These technologies promise the world but a proper historical understanding of narrow technologies failing to upset established broad technologies, combined with a detailed understanding of missile defense along with some notable design flaws in Chinese systems, makes the author’s assertions more fearmongering than substantive analysis.
