On 4 September, international media reported that the United States and India will seek to finalize a number of important defense agreements. During high-level talks throughout the coming days, diplomats from both countries aim to draw their two militaries closer with cooperation deals and weapons sales.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will meet with India’s Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj and Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman for the so-called two-plus-two discussions. The 2+2 accords have already been canceled twice this year due to diplomatic urgencies—Secretary Pompeo needed to make a quick trip to North Korea the last time the talks were scheduled. Finally it seems the talks will take place. And not a moment too soon. 2+2 is the highest level of dialogue between the two countries and was already agreed upon by President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi last year. The meeting between American and Indian representatives comes at an important time. There are some very consequential issues at stake on the geopolitical scene that need to be sorted out in Indo-American relations.
The Small Stuff
Talks between the two countries are covering two distinct categories. There are big issues, regional alliances, and long-term strategies. And then there’s the more nitty gritty. As is the nature of these matters, the small stuff reflects the big stuff.
One of the details India is very interested in nailing down is the purchase of some new advance-weapons platforms from the U.S. According to India-based media, New Delhi wants to buy remotely piloted aircraft systems that can operate at an altitude of more than 5,500 meters above sea level. The drones “need to be equipped with three complete sets of sensor packages with day and night capabilities and two airborne data relays to control the unmanned system beyond the line of sight.” This is just the latest move by India to incorporate more drone tech into its military. The military will reportedly come up with a formal plan by next April and decide whether these platforms will be manufactured at home or purchased from a foreign country, most likely Israel. Another piece of news emanating from India regarding drones was the release of India’s first drone legislation. In addition to requiring licenses and setting an age limit for operating these machines, the law also sets down a series of no-fly zones for drones. Included in these location are areas 25 kilometers from any international border, 500 meters from a coastal area, three kilometers from any military installation, and five kilometers from any airport. This legal development may seem less interesting to the foreign observer, but really, the military’s drive for drone procurement and the recently codified domestic drone policy are two sides of the same coin. India has become aware of its need for drones to surveille its enemies and patrol its borders. At the same time India doesn’t want to become the victim of these same tools by foreign operatives—or even just kids having a fun time who decide to post their aerial photo of a military base to their Instagram account for the whole world to see.
So what is driving India’s obsession with drones as of late? Well, China of course.
It is well understood in the region surrounding the Himalayas that China and India have never really gotten over the short but bitter war they fought in 1962. There are still remnants of this conflict today. The Chinese do not recognize the northern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of India. They claim most of the state as theirs and refer to it as “Southern Tibet.” But recently, New Delhi’s concerns over China have grown to more than just the residue of a decades-old conflict. There is a general sense of Chinese expansionism felt by many Asian countries. Add to this recent Indian government projects to expand roads and highways in Arunachal—infrastructure many are concerned could be utilized by invading Chinese forces—and you have China very high on the list of national security concerns.
Of course the U.S. is happy to work with a partner that shares its fears of a growing China.
And this of course leads us into some of the bigger issues Pompeo and Mattis are undoubtedly interested in bringing up.
The Big Stuff
From a grand-strategy perspective, the 2+2 meeting is all about taking Indo-American relations up a notch.
As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Joseph Dunford told reporters traveling with him to the talks “the 2+2 presents an historic opportunity to develop our growing partnership and to explore ways of enhancing our security cooperation.” India and the U.S. have had ample defense cooperation over the years. In the early Bush era, the administration took the step of opening military intelligence channels with New Delhi. The General Security Of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was signed by India and the U.S. in 2002. From there the defense connection only increased. High-level meetings between the two countries increased during 2002 and 2003. In January 2004, the U.S. and India launched the “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP), a largely symbolic move, but one that did at least set the stage for more cooperation, especially in the field of critical technology sharing. Over the past ten years, the defense partnership between the two countries took on a new dimension in light of mutual concerns over a growing China. American policymakers began to push for more cooperation and defense sales as a key part of a counter-China strategy. Another major deal was signed in 2016 in the form of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), permitting the military of either country to use the others’ bases for re-supplying or carrying out repairs. A subtle but important sign of America’s strategy establishing its defense presence around the Indian subcontinent came earlier this year, when the U.S. military renamed its Pacific Command the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. Perhaps more than any past deal with New Delhi, this move underscored the growing importance of India to the Pentagon.
While cooperation with India has been steadily moving forward, American policymakers also want to insure India is in fact on the same page as the U.S. on key strategic issues. Some concern was raised in Washington three months ago when India decided to move forward with a massive defense deal with Russia to procure five S-400 Triumf advanced Air Defense Systems. This put the administration in a bit of a conundrum. Last year, President Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a response to the interference in the 2016 presidential election that emanated from Russia. This law could in theory be used to sanction India for acquiring Russian weaponry. While it is highly unlikely that the U.S. would actually impose sanctions on India, there is an additional concern the administration had to deal with in light of the India-Russia deal: Why was New Delhi turning to America’s adversary to supply its military? The U.S. government offered its Patriot system as an alternative. But India was uninterested. The U.S. has made such a fuss over the S-400 deal; many have been lead to believe the whole 2+2 will evolve around that one issue. Secretary Pompeo assured reporters that while the topic will “certainly come up” he does not think “they will be the primary focus of what it is we are trying to accomplish” during the meeting.
One thing is for sure, America is not looking for trouble with India. The real goal of U.S. diplomats at the upcoming talks is to ensure that they can continue relying on India as an asset and that the Indo-American partnership will remain solid. India acquiring weapons from Moscow is certainly a bump in the road, but there are ways of avoiding that becoming a problem. Built into the U.S. sanctions system is the possibility of a waiver. Secretary Mattis has been pushing lawmakers to grant one to India for nearly two months. Support for such a waiver will probably be bolstered by the fact that India is now interested in buying large U.S. weapons platforms.
In the end, the common interests of India and the US—countering China, insuring free trade and movement in the Indian Ocean, countering Islamic militancy in the region—will be the determining factors in the 2+2 talks. The upcoming meetings will be a chance for the two nations to build joint policy based on these very important mutual interests.
