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The Russia-Israel Tango — An Analysis of Not-So-Blurred Lines

The past two months saw the dramatic collapse of what was one of the strongest strategic understandings in the Middle East. Ever since Russia started directly involving itself in the Syrian civil war back in 2012, an agreement reached between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has allowed both countries to avoid becoming open adversaries.

Israel and Russia both had their own interests to look after. For Russia, this consisted of maintaining a military port in Tartus, and propping up Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For Israel, the focus was on preventing Iran from establishing itself on the Israeli-Syrian border, and foiling the Islamic Republic from ferrying advanced missiles to the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon.

Israel views the prospect of advanced weapons, such as pinpoint missiles, reaching Hezbollah with utmost severity. Repeatedly, in what has turned out to be an extraordinary intelligence success, Israeli fighter jets have bombed weapons convoys heading across the desert to Lebanon and missile warehouses in Damascus.

Both Netanyahu and Putin were careful not to cross the other’s red lines. Any Israeli action to weaken the Assad regime, from arming rebel groups to trumpeting successful airstrikes, could have spelled disaster for the shaky agreement, as Russia made it clear that it would not look the other way if their hard-earned gains in Syria were to be unraveled by the Jewish state.

For Israel, meanwhile, its red lines vis-à-vis Russia were anything that countenanced Iranian weapons-smuggling to Hezbollah. This included Russia using their state-of-the-art radar systems to foil Israeli airstrikes in the region. As such, an uneasy truce took hold between the two sides. Israeli forces would obliterate Hezbollah cells from the air and destroy bases housing Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps but largely Syrian forces that operated independent of Iran off limits.

To keep potential conflicts from escalating, a direct line was established between Russian headquarters in Latakia and the Israeli Air Force, similar to the famous “Red Phone” connecting Washington and the Kremlin during the Cold War.

As part of these communications, Israel would inform Russia shortly before launching airstrikes in Syria, and Russia would in turn refrain from informing Syria and Iran. With Russia’s S-400 air defense systems in Syria, capable of detecting take-offs from every Israeli air force base, Israeli air assaults would have been largely unsuccessful had Russia not agreed to keep the information to itself.

The mechanism had its shaky moments. For example, Russian SU-34 fighters challenged Israeli F-16s during a sortie back in May 2018 and forced them out of the area. Only a direct call to Moscow averted a dogfight. However, the quiet agreement proved itself time and time again.

“The deconfliction mechanism keeps working as before,” a high-ranking Israeli air officer told the media in September. “It turned out to be highly effective over the past three years… Our task is to go ahead with the coordination while maintaining Israel’s strategic security interests.”

The Israel-Russian tango was only made possible by Prime Minister Netanyahu’s ability to handle both the Russians and the Americans. Despite being a known ally of the U.S., Israel was able to simultaneously maintain good terms with Russia, despite the increasingly adversarial relations between the two superpowers.

This was particularly noticeable this past May, when Netanyahu was brought as Putin’s honored guest to a Moscow parade celebrating the end of World War II—despite the fact that Israeli warplanes had just bombed Damascus the night before.

Events that have taken place over the past two months, however, have damaged this understanding, and now pit Israel against Russia in a dangerous turn of events that may cause the United States to up its involvement in the region.

The first event was the downing of a Russian military jet in Syria on September 17. As part of an Israeli attack near the Russian military city of Latakia, Syrian anti-aircraft defenses accidently shot down a Russian Il-20 spy plane, killing all 15 aboard.

Russia’s reaction was apocalyptic. Disregarding the fact that Israeli jets had been out of Syrian airspace for almost half an hour when the Russian plane fell out of the sky, Putin blamed Israel for the tragedy. Despite a high-level Israeli delegation that traveled to Russia and presented the sequence of events, Putin announced that he would sell the S-300 anti-aircraft system to Syria.

Having the S-300 in Syrian hands is Israel’s worst nightmare. Arguably the best air defense system around, the S-300 could not only down any Israeli warplane but could also shoot down Israeli civilian traffic if Assad desired.

In addition, the S-300 would severely hamper Israel’s freedom to operate in Syria and Lebanon. With its radar coverage topping 300 kilometers, the S-300 grounds most of Israel’s fleet, forcing the Israeli Air Force to rely entirely on its squadron of F-35 stealth jets as they are its only aircraft impervious to radar.

Israeli defense officials’ hopes that Russia wouldn’t follow through with the S-300 delivery were soon dashed. In what seemed like a deliberate Russian action to poke Israel in the eye, Russia released a video in October showing Russian troops unloading the 13 S-300 batteries at Hmeimim Air Base in Syria.

Disregarding its propensity to unload aging and lesser quality weapons systems to its allies, Russia presented Syria with an upgraded version of the S-300, one with enhanced radar and target tracking capabilities. In addition, reports say that Russia gave the S-300 to Syria for free.

A day later, Putin announced that “it is not Russia’s job to get Iran out of Syria,” an about-face from the Russian leader’s stated policy that the Islamic Republic will not be allowed to establish itself militarily under his watch. Israel had been counting on Russian promises to reign in Iran, and Putin’s surprising statement caused an uproar among Israeli leaders.

Finally, a report by Israel’s Hadashot television channel said that Russia wants more notice before Israel embarks on airstrikes in Syria. Instead of the customary ten minutes, Russia is now demanding upwards of an hour’s notice.

Israel sees such a demand as unacceptable. Such a lengthy advanced warning could give Iranian personnel time to escape before the squadrons swoop in. Even more seriously, Syria can use the advance notice to take the necessary measures and shoot Israeli jets out of the sky.

The demand was in fact ruled out by Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Liberman, who said that “we will not accept any restrictions on our freedom of operation and when it comes to our national security, we will take action.”

It’s clear that something has changed between Russia and Israel. From a fruitful partnership that benefited both sides, Russia seems intent on making its relations with Israel adversarial.

What is the reason for this?

Observers say that Putin’s increased assertiveness vis-à-vis Israel is a result of Russian estimates that the United States will up its presence in the Middle East. One of the planks underpinning Russia’s decision to cooperate with Israel throughout the bloody civil war was that the alternative meant the United States expanding its influence on the happenings in Syria.

Should they stop Israel from striking Iranian weapons shipments to Lebanon, reasoned Russia, then Hezbollah’s advanced missiles would cause an all-out war with Israel that would result in U.S. intervention. An assertive U.S. in the region is Russia’s worst-case scenario; having sacrificed both blood and treasure to maintain its sphere of influence in Syria, Russia does not want to cede control to the United States.

That’s why mighty Russia, with the fifth largest military in the world, had to respect the wishes of Israel, a nation with a minuscule yet effective army.

Now, however, Russia sees that the Trump administration has essentially retreated from the Middle East. Unlike in years past, when the U.S. viewed itself as the region’s referee, the current government is either too busy with other foreign policy imbroglios such as trade wars or caught up in the White House’s chaotic atmosphere. Along with Trump clearly showing a presence to withdraw the U.S. special forces from Syria, Putin knows that he can act unheeded.