Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL’s newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.
I’m RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the terrorist threat Russia poses to the EU, and Brussels’ expanded mission to Ukraine.
Briefing #1: Russia’s Terrorist Threat To The EU
What You Need To Know: Earlier this month, the European Union produced an internal document, seen by RFE/RL, spelling out the threat assessment facing the bloc.
The 23-page document — prepared by the Council of the European Union, which represents the governments of the 27 EU member states — mostly covers developments and trends from 2025.
It notes that terrorism and violent extremism “pose a significant threat to the EU,” citing heightened risks from Afghanistan and Iran.
But, interestingly, it also covers Russia’s war in Ukraine and what negative spillover effects it could have for the bloc.
The text admits that the “impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on the terrorist threat both in Europe and globally has so far been limited” but warns that it is “likely that the flow of small arms, light weapons and explosives in particular will have consequences in the medium and long term.”
Deep Background: Apart from the inflow of weapons, the memo also stresses that war in Ukraine has led to an increased threat to the EU’s internal security, including the sabotage of critical infrastructure.
There are already numerous examples of this, such as ships belonging to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet severing undersea cables in the Baltic Sea or alleged Russian agents attempting — and sometimes successfully managing — to set buildings on fire in several EU member states, with law enforcement in Czechia, Germany, and the Baltic states having uncovered such plots in recent years.
There is no common European definition designating sabotage like this as terrorism, even though some individual member states classify these types of actions as such.
The increased use of drones is also mentioned.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) straying from Russia into Poland last fall caused one of the biggest crises within NATO, and drones whose countries of origin were never officially identified also caused issues at airports in Copenhagen and Oslo.
The document warns that larger terrorist attacks involving UAVs in combination with radioactive material can happen, stating that drones and other types of unmanned devices and vehicles “would allow terrorists to perpetrate attacks remotely. This would enable specific attack scenarios with a potentially magnified impact, for which unmanned aerial vehicles could also be customized and used in combination with various weapons, potentially including non-conventional agents, such as radioactive or biological material.”
The paper notes that, while there haven’t been any clear-cut acts of terrorism involving drones in the bloc so far, “recent incidents involving the malicious or irresponsible use of drones have exposed significant and growing security challenges for the EU.”
Drilling Down
- The final challenge stemming from the Ukraine war that the document warns about is the possibility of “violent extremists fighting on either side of the front line and their possible return to or entry into the EU.”
- Estonia cautioned back in January that former Russian soldiers do pose a threat to the EU. In a discussion paper shared with other members of the bloc, Tallinn pointed out that some 1.5 million Russian citizens have taken part in combat operations in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 — including both regular armed forces of the Russian Federation and proxy units such as the Wagner Group.
- Of those, some 640,000 remain actively engaged today. The paper also cautioned that 180,000 Russian prisoners have been released early so they can head to Ukraine, often fighting in special military units.
- The Estonian document warned that “many returnees have already committed serious crimes. The total number of which has reached a 15-year high in Russia in the first half of 2025, and this upsurge is likely linked to the mass return of ex-combatants”.
- Many EU countries are now fearing that some of these combatants may come to the EU to cause further trouble. In June, the bloc’s foreign ministers look set to agree to work together to prevent as many of these ex-soldiers as possible from entering the Schengen zone by placing them on a so-called Schengen entry ban list.
- Valid for five years, this blacklisting would automatically cover all EU countries, apart from Cyprus and Ireland, as well as the non-EU Schengen members Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
- Estonia has already blacklisted hundreds of Russian ex-soldiers since the start of the year, but more countries are now set to join the effort to add more names to the lists.
Briefing #2: The EU Expands Its Ukraine Mission
What You Need To Know: Earlier in May, the EU quietly managed to vote through another Ukraine-related issue that had been blocked by Hungary since late 2025 — the expansion of the mandate of the bloc’s advisory mission to Ukraine, known as EUAM Ukraine, which largely offers help in reforming the country’s rule of law and civilian security sector, such as the police.
EUAM’s competences are now expanding further in two specific areas with work expected to start as early as this summer — helping Kyiv combat hybrid threats from Moscow and assisting Ukrainian war veterans.
The adopted proposal, seen by RFE/RL, notes that Brussels should help Ukraine with “the protection of critical infrastructure, cyber security and countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) and Russia’s and other actors’ online recruitment amongst susceptible and vulnerable groups for subversive or terrorist actions against Ukraine.”
The second area that EUAM will focus on is supporting efforts to (re)integrate Ukrainian war veterans in civilian security and civil protection sectors together with the country’s ministries for veterans’ affairs, internal affairs, and state emergency services.
Deep Background: Already in November 2025, EU member states agreed to the expansion at a lower diplomatic level, but it never reached on ambassadorial level as the Budapest government of Viktor Orban refused to agree on any EU measures supporting Ukraine in the run-up to the Hungarian parliamentary elections in mid-April, which saw the defeat of Orban’s Fidesz party after 16 years in power.
It may not have gotten the same media attention as the new Russia sanctions finally agreed upon after a three-month stalemate or the 90-billion-euro ($105 billion) loan to Kyiv that Budapest had also been blocking since January, largely because it appears very bureaucratic, and on paper rather insignificant, but it will actually play a big role in transforming the war-torn country into an EU member state in the future.
For Ukraine to be able to join the EU, issues such as fundamental rights, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and justice reform are what Brussels is most concerned about, and the EU and its member states will demand that everything is functional before even considering Ukraine’s accession to the bloc.
Drilling Down
- • In Brussels corridors, accession chapters 23 and 24 are the famous “fundamentals” that every EU candidate country will open first and close last in negotiations with the blov. For Ukraine, the opening of these chapters will probably happen as early as mid-June. What will follow are likely years of tough reforms.
- But to be successful here, EUAM will play a crucial role. First, it will in many ways be the bloc’s “eyes and ears” on the ground in Ukraine in these reform efforts. Second, it will assist Kyiv as much as possible in meeting Brussels’ demands.
- And it has already put in some of the hard miles. EUAM Ukraine began operations back in 2014, a few months after the Euromaidan revolution, which ousted a Moscow-friendly government and kickstarted Ukraine’s Western orientation.
- The stated goal of EUAM is to make the Ukrainian civil security sector more efficient and transparent. In fact, it has been working with all the country’s law enforcement and rule of law institutions for over a decade with offices in Kyiv, Lviv, and Odesa, plus a mobile unit of law enforcement experts who travel around the country. It also had offices in Mariupol and Kharkiv that are currently nonoperational due to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
- It now has close to 400 staff and a budget of 123 million euros ($140 million), which will grow to nearly 130 million euros with the latest expansion to deal with hybrid attacks and veteran affairs. But it is not the first time the EU has expanded EUAM’s functions as Ukraine’s needs have evolved during the war.
- With the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, the mission now also provides support to Ukrainian authorities to investigate and prosecute international crimes committed in relation to Russian atrocities. A lot of this work will feed into the not-yet-functional Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine that the Council of Europe is working on.
- EUAM was also crucial in facilitating the flow of Ukrainian refugees to Poland, Romania, and Slovakia in the direct aftermath of the all-out invasion and assisted in the subsequent European flow of humanitarian aid into Ukraine.
Looking Ahead
NATO foreign ministers will gather in the southern Swedish city of Helsingborg on May 21-22 for an informal ministerial — the last such meeting before the actual NATO summit in Ankara in early July.
No decisions will be taken, but expect all eyes to be on US Secretary of State Marco Rubio as Washington has threatened to withdraw some American troops from Europe amid transatlantic tensions over the war in Iran.
That’s all for this week! Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or via e-mail at [email protected] .
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
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