President Donald Trump said in an interview with Fox News that the Iranian regime came close to reaching a full agreement with the United States five times, only to pull back at the last moment each time.
Some may interpret this simply as a tactic to buy time. But in reality, it reveals a deeper contradiction that has existed inside the Islamic Republic since its creation.
What gives Trump’s remarks significance is the fact that parts of the Iranian government and diplomatic establishment may genuinely want an agreement, while the regime’s hard core – including elements of the pro-regime Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the security apparatus and the forces responsible for internal repression – ultimately fears the political and ideological cost of peace may be greater than the cost of continuing the crisis.
These repeated reversals reflect the existence of two competing logical paradigms inside the regime:
One line of logic understands that without reducing tensions abroad, Iran’s economic and social crisis could push public anger toward an explosive point. In some sectors, food inflation has moved from double digits toward triple digits.
The other line fears that de-escalation would accelerate ideological erosion and weaken the loyalty of forces that keep the regime in power – especially now, when the government appears more vulnerable after the recent war and has already lost part of its strategic capacity.
These two competing logics have always coexisted uneasily inside the Islamic Republic.
At its core, the conflict has revolved around one fundamental question: Should the regime adapt to survive, or preserve its ideological identity through permanent confrontation?
Many ideological and security-driven regimes depend on a constant sense of external threat to maintain internal cohesion. When society is placed in a climate of “war,” “siege,” “foreign conspiracy” or “imminent danger,” it becomes easier to justify political repression, heavy security spending and strict internal controls.
According to officials inside the regime itself, more than 100,000 security personnel are deployed day and night in the streets, operating patrols and checkpoints to prevent the return of another uprising. In the absence of a permanent threat narrative, how can the regime justify keeping such a massive security apparatus mobilized indefinitely?
That is why a lasting ceasefire – or a serious reduction in tensions – could create dangerous consequences for the regime:
- weakening morale among the Basij and IRGC forces;
- reducing the psychological readiness for constant repression and permanent street deployment;
- increasing doubts and questioning among the regime’s own supporters; and most importantly,
- shifting public attention away from the “foreign enemy” and back toward Iran’s internal crises: corruption, poverty, water shortages, inflation and deep social inequality.
From an institutional perspective, much of the Islamic Republic’s power structure is built around permanent securitization. Organizations such as the IRGC, the Basij and the wider security networks are no longer merely military institutions. They have become central pillars of Iran’s political and economic system, extending into nearly every aspect of public life. As a result, reducing external tensions could gradually undermine – and eventually even delegitimize – the political necessity of this entire security structure.
For a regime whose survival depends heavily on permanent emergency and perpetual hostility, peace is not simply the end of an external crisis. It can also become the beginning of a profound internal identity crisis.
A structural divide under the shadow of uprising
This structural divide has always existed, but perhaps never at this level of intensity. Today, the regime faces not only greater economic and regional weakness, but also the persistent fear of renewed nationwide unrest. The protests that shook Iran before the war were interrupted by the conflict, but the grievances behind them remain alive in the collective memory of society.
That is why the government continues to maintain a massive security presence in the streets.
Fear of renewed protests has trapped the regime between two opposing pressures: the need for de-escalation abroad and the fear of peace at home.
Over the course of its existence, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly shown that it is capable of tactical retreat. It can accept limited agreements, temporary ceasefires or short-term deals. But achieving a lasting strategic peace is far more difficult, because key parts of the regime are built not around normal state interests, but around the logic of permanent confrontation: a sanctions-based and security-driven economy; the IRGC’s regional influence and expanding economic control over nearly every sector of life; and the constant mobilization of ideological forces inside the country.
This is why the regime is capable of producing and managing crises, but far less capable of ending them. The Islamic Republic today resembles neither a system fully prepared for war nor one truly capable of peace. Instead, it appears trapped in a state of permanent suspension – unable to fully enter war, yet equally unable to embrace a peace that could gradually erode the ideological and security foundations on which it depends.
