Even as Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly discussed signing the U.S. agreement, a demonstration organized by a rival faction of the regime was unfolding in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, with participants opposed to the agreement chanting “Death to Araghchi!”
Those attacks – launched by the rival faction allied with Saeed Jalili, the unsuccessful candidate in the last presidential election – reflect a widespread belief among part of the ruling establishment that a peace agreement could create deep fractures within the regime’s hardline core and pave the way for new popular uprisings. They also reveal the regime’s difficulty in politically managing the consequences of such an agreement.
The reason is straightforward: For decades, the Tehran regime has mobilized its supporters around the slogan “Death to America.” By concluding an agreement with Washington, it deprives part of its ideological apparatus of its principal justification. Such a development could weaken both the motivation of its supporters and the effectiveness of its repressive machinery.
Moreover, the regime has been significantly weakened on the military and security fronts following two wars. Added to this are the blockade of southern ports and the collapse of oil exports, both of which have intensified economic pressure. In this context, many Iranian economists believe the regime’s financial resources could come under severe strain within the next two to three months.
While many observers believe an agreement between the United States and the Islamic Republic could provide Tehran with economic and political relief, a different interpretation is emerging within the Iranian opposition, particularly if the agreement includes the sensitive issue of the regime’s nuclear program. Maryam Rajavi, leader of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the principal Iranian opposition organization, has repeatedly stated that she welcomes setbacks suffered by the regime because they contribute to the emergence of centers of resistance and national uprising throughout Iran.
This analysis is based on a simple premise: When a regime is forced to abandon a project that it has presented for decades as a symbol of its power, legitimacy and political identity, the political cost of such a retreat can be as significant as the economic benefits expected from the agreement itself – or even fatal.
Before being killed in a U.S. airstrike, Ali Khamenei frequently repeated: “One does not commit suicide out of fear of death.” He viewed abandoning the nuclear program as a form of political suicide. According to a former head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, the nuclear project has cost more than $2 trillion, while contributing to the impoverishment of millions of Iranians.
The history of the Islamic Republic offers a striking precedent. In 1988, when Ayatollah Khomeini accepted a ceasefire with Iraq after eight years of war, he described the decision as drinking a “chalice of poison.” The phrase reflected the regime’s difficulty in accepting a decision that contradicted years of ideological mobilization in favor of continuing the conflict.
Khomeini himself repeatedly declared that Iran would continue fighting “to the last house in Tehran.” At the time, the war had become an integral part of the regime’s political identity.
However, that retreat was followed by the execution of approximately 30,000 political prisoners and the establishment of a climate of terror throughout society, aimed at offsetting the political consequences of the regime’s reversal.
For leaders of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the nuclear issue today occupies a place comparable to that held by the war under Ayatollah Khomeini. For decades, Iranian authorities have portrayed the nuclear program as a symbol of national sovereignty and strategic power. It has thus become an essential component of the regime’s identity.
Will the new leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, be able to compensate for such a setback through large-scale repression? This is one of the key questions surrounding the future of the Islamic Republic.
Under these circumstances, even a partial abandonment of the nuclear program would not be viewed as a mere diplomatic concession. In the eyes of the Iranian opposition, such a move would constitute a new “chalice of poison” for the regime, comparable in its political significance to Ayatollah Khomeini’s acceptance of the 1988 ceasefire.
Such a decision could have profound consequences for the political cohesion of the system and deepen existing fractures within the ruling establishment. According to this analysis, divisions at the highest levels of the state could create favorable conditions for the emergence of a new large-scale protest movement, at a time when the regime appears increasingly vulnerable.
