Welcome to Wider Europe, RFE/RL’s newsletter focusing on the key issues concerning the European Union, NATO, and other institutions and their relationships with the Western Balkans and Europe’s Eastern neighborhoods.
I’m RFE/RL Europe Editor Rikard Jozwiak, and this week I am drilling down on two issues: the upcoming EU-Western Balkans summit and why Brussels is fast-tracking EU enlargement decisions ahead of a difficult 2027.
Briefing #1: Tougher Talk On Serbia As EU, Balkan Leaders Meet
What You Need To Know: On November 25, the European Union will host the leaders of the six Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia & Serbia) that are still officially aiming to join the bloc.
While these summits are semiannual affairs that don’t normally produce much news, the two previous ones — in Brussels in December 2025 and in Montenegro this June — proved politically volatile at least by EU standards as the combative Serbian president at the time, Alexander Vucic, was at the center of numerous rows.
Now that Vucic has been ousted from power following the October 25 parliamentary election in which the yet leaderless and heterogenous Student List movement proved triumphant, this summit will be the first real test of whether the EU is actually capable of pulling the EU hopefuls in the region toward eventual membership.
Deep Background: An early draft declaration seen by RFE/RL indicates Brussels is at least attempting to become pushier in its demands and sending a few messages to the new leadership in Belgrade — if they even are in place by the time of the summit, that is.
The new Serbian parliament convenes on November 17, so if a new cabinet isn’t sworn in quickly there is a good chance that caretaker Duro Macut might still represent the country at the Brussels meeting.
It also depends, though, on whether a declaration is agreed in the first place. At the June summit, it was not approved for the first time since the regular EU-Western Balkans format began in 2018. Belgrade refused to endorse language in the text demanding countries in the region align with EU sanctions on Russia as well as balking at the conditionality of the proposed Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue.
Drilling Down
- The current draft has sharpened language on both issues in a clear nod to the incoming Student List leadership, which on the campaign trail as well as since winning the election has expressed major reservations about the need for high-level political dialogue with Kosovo and to change Serbia’s cozy relations with the Kremlin.
- The reference to the dialogue is much higher in the text than in previous years and with more political urgency., noting that “the absence of a normalization of relations between Pristina and Belgrade continues to hold back both partners on their European path. All agreements reached in the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue must be implemented.”
- It adds that EU financial support under the 6 billion euro Western Balkans Reform and Growth Facility “is conditioned on the partners’ constructive engagement with measurable progress and tangible results in the normalization of their relations.”
- No dialogue at the highest political level has taken place since EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas took office in late 2024. The last such meeting occurred in September 2023 under her predecessor, Josep Borrell.
- While diplomats both in the bloc and in the region believe this dialogue “to be dead,” EU officials still harbor hopes of resuscitating it at some point. EU sources tell RFE/RL that the Brussels leadership has been in touch with Kosovar Prime minister Albin Kurti, urging him to give Belgrade’s incoming leadership “the benefit of the doubt.”
- Perhaps the biggest message to Serbia and the students in the prospective declaration is the need to come to terms with the past. The EU was shocked by the images of Serbia’s official and public adulation of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladic at his September funeral.
- The text states: “Any glorification of war criminals, genocide denial, and revisionism contradicts the most fundamental European values. We call on all Western Balkans partners to promote a culture of respect for and solidarity with all victims and of respect for verdicts from international and domestic courts relating to war crimes.”
- The Vucic government’s refusal to distance itself from Mladic’s glorification convinced even pro-Serbian EU member states not to push for the opening of EU accession Cluster 3 with Belgrade, consisting of eight mainly economy-related negotiation chapters. Serbia has not moved forward toward EU membership since late 2021, and Vucic even boycotted the EU-Western Balkans summit in December last year over what he saw as a lack of progress notably on this cluster.
- It is also clear from the text that the EU is increasingly annoyed that both China and the United States are vying for economic and political influence in the region.
- The declaration, which the Western Balkan countries must decide (or not) to align with on summit day, pointedly notes that “we count on the Western Balkans partners to communicate to their citizens that the EU remains the region’s main investor and trading partner, as well as its largest provider of financial assistance and a reliable security partner. Furthermore, the EU contributes to stability and security across Europe.”
- The document points out that the EU has financed things such as 500 public WiFi hotspots in the region and welcomed Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia into the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA). It also makes a reference to the flagship policy of extending the EU’s “roam like home” program to the region, which would allow no extra mobile data costs. Negotiations on this scheme started earlier in November and could enter into force in early 2027.
Briefing #2: Why 2027 Will Be Tough For EU Enlargement
What You Need To Know: At the European Commission’s annual enlargement forum in Brussels on November 16, leaders from both the bloc and various candidate countries spoke confidently about a bigger and more powerful EU. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen spoke of the “courage and foresight to build a larger union” and announced that, “for the first time in many years, we have a real prospect of enlargement in front of us.”
Finnish President Alexander Stubb mused about whether the United Kingdom might re-join and half-jokingly expressed hope that Canada could become a member of sorts in the future.
Deep Background: Enlargement may not exactly be at the top of Europe’s agenda as it heads into 2027. This is largely due to some major elections coming up in key European countries, with the main being the French presidential elections in April-May.
Most EU officials seem already resigned to the real possibility that right-wing populist Marine Le Pen will sweep to power. Le Pen and her party, the National Rally, have been critical of any EU enlargement in terms of Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans in general.
Her party is also set to make further gains in the parliamentary elections that follow the presidential ones, potentially stopping even EU accession frontrunner Montenegro from joining as it hopes in 2028 or 2029. Under the French Constitution, ratifying the treaty for any new member requires either a national referendum or a three-fifths majority in both the lower house, the French national assembly, and in the upper one, the Senate.
While all eyes are on France, there are also other worries. In Italy, Guiseppe Conte, leader of the left-wing populist Five-Star moment and a vocal opponent of Ukraine joining the EU, has a real chance of becoming prime minister. And Poland might elect a government consisting of right-wing parties keen to blame Ukrainian migrants, protect domestic farmers from Ukrainian agri-products, and make historical grievances a central part of relations with Kyiv.
Drilling Down
- This is why Brussels is trying to get as much done as possible on enlargement in the coming months. For Montenegro, that means potentially closing another four accession chapters this week.
- That would leave only six chapters, something the current Irish EU Council presidency believes is feasible before the end of the year, when Lithuania takes over the rotating presidency and deals with the final two (chapter 34-35) institutional chapters before the accession treaty could be ready for Montenegro to sign in June.
- Ukraine and Moldova, however, will soon will be “decoupled” after walking hand-in-hand on their respective EU path since 2022. But first they need to open together the remaining two clusters, consisting of nine negotiating chapters.
- Moldovan President Maia Sandu and Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskiy told the forum they hope this can happen before Christmas. That, of course, requires unanimity of the 27 EU member states, and so far Hungary has refused to give its OK for Brussels to send so-called screening letters for that pair of clusters, preventing them from being opened.
- Budapest reportedly has no new political demands for Kyiv but, according to several EU sources RFE/RL has been in touch with under the condition of anonymity, is eyeing more EU funds that so far has remained frozen due to the previous Hungarian government’s rule of law backsliding. The Hungarian green light might therefore come as soon as this week, making it possible to indeed have all clusters/chapters for both opened in 2026.
- When everything does open, Moldova will clearly speed ahead. The European Commission admitted as much when it published its annual enlargement report this month with accompanying roadmaps for 2027. For Moldova, it hopes to close a full 25 of the 33 policy chapters that year whereas for Ukraine the same number is a mere nine.
- Then there are the so-called interim benchmarks (known in Brussels corridors as “IBAR”) on issues related to rule of law and fundamental rights. Moldova handed in its self-assessment earlier this month, and the European Commission is likely to give the thumbs up later in November, sending over the file to EU member states.
- This could be approved by the start of the new year. A positive IBAR assessment is a necessity to close any negotiation chapters. For Ukraine, the full assessment might not be ready until the spring, which opens a gap between Kyiv and Chisinau.
- Sandu was coy about the decoupling, noting diplomatically that Chisinau was “not in a competition with any other candidate country,” and adding, “We want Ukraine to advance as it would be great to be surrounded by EU member states.”
- Koretskiy, on the other hand, said he has more pressing concerns than the enlargement process, notably the daily Russian attacks on his country, saying it’s hard to do political work when there is “a bomb alarm 20 hours a day.”
- He also added that Moscow currently was aiming “to destroy everything in Ukraine this winter” and was also looking to exploit the current Ukrainian state budget gap of over 70 billion euros, which the EU hopes to partly cover with a new 45 billion euro loan that will be presented this week.
Looking Ahead
The Ukraine defense contact group (known as Ramstein) and the EU defense ministerial are both meeting in Brussels on November 17. Nominally, they will deal with how various Western countries could do more to help Ukrainian militarily, but most eyes will be on US Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, who will attend both meetings.
Any comments of his on Ukraine will be closely dissected, but what most Europeans will be after are any hints about the US forces’ posture review that is due soon in which Washington might announce troop reduction from the continent.
That’s all for this week!
Feel free to reach out to me on any of these issues on X @RikardJozwiak, or on e-mail at [email protected].
Until next time,
Rikard Jozwiak
If you enjoyed this briefing and don’t want to miss the next edition subscribe here.