OpsLens

Russian Escalation in Eastern Europe

New satellite images reveal Russian military improvements in the Kaliningrad pocket. The particular geography of the pocket, the improvements being made, and the strategic situation make this worthy of further assessment. The Kaliningrad pocket was formerly the East Prussian area of Germany. It is now Russian territory that provides a critical port on the Baltic Sea for the Russians and it borders Poland and the Baltic States. Between the Russian- owned Kaliningrad and the Russian allied country Belarus, there is a 60-mile-wide border of Poland and Lithuania called the Suwalki Gap. In the event of hostilities this is a vital land bridge that American and NATO forces in Poland would use to transport forces in defense of the Baltic States, and it needs to be held against possible pincer movements of the Russians and their allies.

As a result of that geography any change in conditions becomes important to assess, and the Russians have made four changes. Images reveal they are fortifying a bunker and building at least 40 new ones. Images also show they are upgrading the Chkalovsk Air Base, including a new railway and the installation of an instrument landing system that would allow aircraft to land in inclement weather. The final upgrade includes the Chernyakhovsk base receiving nuclear-capable Iskander missiles.

The bunkers provide hardening and redundancy in the case of conflict. These are two factors that analysts have said the U.S. needs in the region as well. Moreover, for the Russians this represents a significant investment and potential staying power in case of a conflict. They also seem to be countering what would be the likely NATO response of using overwhelming airpower to compensate for numerical inferiority in land units.

The new systems aiding the flight helps Russia increase its air capabilities in the area. This would further counteract Western air superiority and increase the Russian ability to provide year-round air support. In the event of hostilities, it decreases the round-trip time for combat sorties, which increases their active time in the air and their range against responding Western European forces.

The missiles are likely the most dangerous escalation. The intermediate missiles contribute to what some analysts say is their anti-access area denial (A2AD) strategy that uses overwhelming amounts of missiles to deny access to critical areas in the early part of a potential conflict. With the geography of the Kaliningrad pocket, that denial would give the Russians time to overrun the Baltic States and essentially dare NATO to wage a war of liberation.

The Iskander missiles are even more dangerous if they are armed with intermediate-ranged nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile crisis started over the placement of Russian missiles in Cuba, and ended with the American withdrawals of missiles from Turkey. The American ambassador to NATO has already said there may be a need to “take out” Russian missiles in violation of the treaty, so this represents a dangerous escalation.

The catalyst for potential war and what course it will take remains hard to predict. That is why it is incredibly important to assess the upgrades that peace-time armies make. The Russians appear to be increasing their long-term staying power through redundancy, increasing their air power, and placing new missiles in the region. The U.S. should make an extra effort to prepare for conflict in Eastern Europe by placing heavier forces, more anti-missile assets, and increasing coordination with their allies in the region.