“In February of this year, the government set up a national De-Radicalization Center…After sitting pretty much empty for five months, and not producing a single graduate, the center closed in July.”
This week, France’s National Assembly, the lower house of the country’s bicameral parliament, will meet to decide on the French Senate’s new law — “To Strengthen Internal Security and Fight Against Terrorism.” This news marks the beginning of France reassessing its methods on addressing radicalization in the country. According to reports, in November, the French government plans to convene to discuss a new plan for a “disengagement” — a nice way of saying de-programing radicals from militant forms of Islam.
The European country cannot deny that it has a home grown terror problem. This phenomenon goes back a while, pre-dating 9/11. Young French men have volunteered to take active participation in fighting in conflict zones for at least the past 25 years.
Since the trend of Islamic terror has taken hold in Europe, and in France particularly, the French have put in some serious efforts to address the problem of radicalization at its root.
In February of this year, the government set up a national De-Radicalization Center, which was an open, fully funded program where radicalized Muslims could go through a 10 month ‘re-program’. After sitting pretty much empty for five months, and not producing a single graduate, the center closed in July.
To analyze why French authorities thought that radicals would line up at their door to be voluntarily re-programed is beyond the scope of this article (or any article). One point that was demonstrated from the De-Radicalization Program was that the French were beginning to identify the very real problem of homegrown militancy, even if they addressed it in a misguided way.
De-radicalization programs, not just in the West but around the world, have all been abysmal failures. The French deciding to turn a new page on dealing with radicalization at home may signal a shift for other countries as well — or so we can hope.
While the “Strengthening Internal Security” bill puts a lot of emphasis on security protocols for public places, the text also discusses hardline tactics to fight domestic terror, including surveillance methods and even policies for “closing places of worship.” The bill really gives the message that French authorities are looking to crack down on this persistent problem.
However, it is important to emphasize what the bill lacks. Simply put, if France is going to get serious with addressing radicalization on the home-front, they are going to have to get their domestic intelligence act together.
Investigations revealed that many residents of the densely settled suburb, with a Muslim population upwards of 40 percent, had been aware of Abdeslamin’s presence, but had refused to report him
The reality is that radicalization does not occur in a vacuum; it has been able to form in the midst of sympathetic-to-the-cause population enclaves. What is the challenge posed by these enclaves, which are almost always located within major European urban centers? While actual terrorists make up an infinitesimally small percentages of the Islamic population, those with mild sympathies to terrorists make up a much larger segment.
This environment is what allows radicalization to breath and grow. It allows it to take off in the form of education, and it also facilitates actual terror activities. Consider the manhunt for Paris attacks suspect Salah Abdeslamin. Abdeslamin was arrested by authorities in the Brussels borough of Molenbeek in March of 2016, after nearly four months on the run. Investigations revealed that many residents of the densely settled suburb, with a Muslim population upwards of 40 percent, had been aware of Abdeslamin’s presence, but had refused to report him.
The only way to have an effective approach to fighting radicalization at home is to organize and implement an intelligence strategy that can operate within this unique environment. When authorities need to target an individual suspect, they must be equipped with knowledge not only of the suspect’s history and family ties, but also the sympathies and affiliations of the neighbors and the activities and trends of the community.
This network of intelligence ensures that security forces are not flying blind in efforts to identify, locate, and arrest terror suspects. This model is emulated by many internal security services in the Middle East, especially Israel’s Sherut Bitahon Klali or, Shabak.
This is not an easy goal to aspire to.
Such an intelligence model would require European security agencies to begin building, with sensitivity and moderation, trust and relationships within areas fraught with anti-government sentiment. Many of these areas are so dangerous to anyone perceived as connected to authorities that official agencies are often restricted from entering.
Over time, however, such an intelligence structure can be built.
As mentioned previously, moves by French policy makers indicate they understand the need to address radicalization at its roots, and hopefully other countries will follow suit.
