The report identified three major factors that should be addressed, including degraded training and readiness, inadequate crew size, and lack of materiel maintenance opportunities.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office testified before the Subcommittees on Readiness and Seapower and Projection Forces, part of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services on September 7th following four high-profile mishaps at sea in 2017.
U.S. Navy mishaps in the 7th Fleet
The report and testimony was completed in response to four mishaps that occurred in the 7th Fleet area of operations near Japan. The most recent mishap took place in August when the Guided Missile Destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) collided with the oil tanker Alnic MC. The incident is currently under investigation. The Navy is expected to release its official findings after it has thoroughly looked into all factors that may have contributed to the collision.
Other incidents include the collision of the USS Fitzgerald with a merchant vessel in June, and the collision of the USS Lake Champlain with a fishing vessel in May. The USS Antietam ran aground in January.
In response to these mishaps, the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson ordered a Navy-wide operational pause to review procedures and readiness. The Navy is looking at these incidents as part of a larger trend that needs to be addressed throughout the fleet. Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin, the previous 7th Fleet commander, has also been relieved of his command due to the incidents.
The report identified three major factors that need to be addressed, including a high operational tempo leading to degraded training and readiness, inadequate crew size, and lack of materiel maintenance opportunities.
Increased requirements on overseas units
The GAO found that the Navy has increased the number of ships forward-deployed overseas. Since 1998, the number of active ships in the Navy has decreased from 333 to 277, while the number based overseas remained constant. This action enabled ships to respond to crisis and maintain a presence worldwide. This has also increased the operational tempo of those ships based overseas with longer deployments and more time at sea.
A typical deployment cycle for ships based in the continental U.S. allows for dedicated periods for maintenance, shore and at-sea training opportunities, and classroom training for shipboard personnel. This contrasts with the forward-deployed schedule, like that of the ships based in Japan, which requires ships to be continuously deployment-ready. Training and maintenance periods are deferred to later, often unscheduled, dates.
The GAO reported that recommendations were made to the DOD in 2015 and action was taken to develop “revised operational schedules for all ships homeported overseas” that included dedicated maintenance and training periods. However, the GAO was unable to receive updated guidance when preparing an updated report for the August 2017 testimony. They reported they were told that “revised operational schedules for the cruisers and destroyers homeported in Japan were still under review.”
Training opportunities and maintenance periods have been sacrificed to allow for this higher operational tempo. A June 2017 report found that 37% of ship warfare certifications were expired for those ships homeported in Japan. This was five times the number of expired certifications found in a similar report from May 2015.
A June 2017 report made regarding Department of Defense readiness highlighted budget shortcomings as a major factor in maintaining a combat-ready force.
Fewer sailors with same workload
Diminished crew size was also found to be a concern. A report from May 2017 identified that crew reductions made in the early 2000s were now impacting ships’ ability to operate effectively. Additionally, the hourly workweek being used to calculate manning requirements does not accurately reflect the amount of time sailors are putting into work. This leads to overworked personnel put in potentially unsafe situations.
In the 2000s, the Navy implemented an “optimal manning” policy, decreasing crew size in the effort to decrease personnel costs. Crew sizes have been increasing but still do not reflect the work time actually put in each week. In a study conducted by the Navy in 2014, sailors were found to be putting in 33% more hours each week than was considered safe as part of a standard workweek. The time was taken from crew rest, leading to culture of sleeplessness and unsafe practices.
The Navy is already working to increase its surface force to meet President Trump’s goal of 355 ships. While commissioning new ships will take years to fully realize, policies to increase personnel numbers are already being enacted. The Navy is increasing the time limits sailors are able to remain in a certain rank without promotion, termed “high-year tenure.” Sailors will still be considered for promotion, but if not selected, will be able to remain on active duty based on their seniority. This will allow manning shortfalls to be addressed, increase the available talent pool, and relieve requirements of those on sea duty.
Necessary maintenance not completed
Finally, ships are increasingly deferring required maintenance. Data from 2011 to 2016 showed that 63% of Destroyers and Cruisers across the Navy were unable to complete maintenance on time, causing 6,603 lost operational days over the six years of the review.
A June 2017 report made regarding Department of Defense readiness highlighted budget shortcomings as a major factor in maintaining a combat-ready force. They recognized that “each military service has been forced to cut critical needs in areas such as training, maintenance, and modernization due to budgetary constraints.” This report addressed the challenges faced by all military services. The Navy-specific challenges identified included a “high pace of operations” that impact completing required maintenance on time.
Data collected from 2009 to 2014 shows that casualty reports which report equipment issues and degradations close to doubled across the Navy. This points to an increase in broken equipment that impacts mission readiness. It may also signify an increased willingness on the part of individual units to report issues via official channels. Casualty reports are fixed through corrective maintenance, which is both unscheduled and costly. Preventative maintenance, such as that conducted during planned maintenance periods, would cut down on these needed corrective repairs.
It should be noted that the USS John S. McCain passed the rigorous Board of Inspection and Survey inspection, INSURV, in May 2017. This signified that the ship was in materiel condition to conduct any and all operations at sea. The inspection takes an in-depth look at equipment, manning, and training, all areas that the GAO’s report noted as problematic for the Navy as a whole. This raises questions that will surely be addressed in the investigation and follow-on recommendations to the Navy as a whole.
The GAO’s full report can be found here.
