“The aftermath of this political squabble will begin to demonstrate how much leverage Washington really maintains over Palestinian rulers, and how much leverage Palestinian leaders are willing to put up with.”
Over the past two weeks, a serious confrontation has been brewing between Washington and Palestinian officials over the future of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) activities in the United States.
In the latest development in this ongoing conflict, the US State Department official told American media in a recent press conference that the government will allow the office of the PLO in Washington, D.C. to remain open—for now.
The announcement comes after a week-long political row between Washington and Palestinian officials.
The clash began after US media reported that Secretary of State Rex Tillerson threatened to close the PLO office following the group’s violation of US law.
What was the nature of the Palestinians’ crime?
In September, several Palestinian advocacy groups submitted a 700-page body of evidence to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague detailing alleged war crimes committed by Israeli officials, either by compliance or direct involvement. The four participating groups, which included the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, urged the ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda in a letter to “urgently open a full investigation into the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory.” The claim made by the Palestinians is that sustained crimes against populations in these areas have been occurring for decades, including “murder, deportation or transfer of population, persecution, and apartheid.”
According to federal regulations, permission for the PLO to operate within the United States is impinged on no Palestinian group pressing charges against Israel via the ICC.
From a purely legal perspective, this rule is designed to prevent political groups from seeking legal action against a US ally through court whose authority America does not recognize.
That, however, is putting it lightly.
The idea that American military officers would be able to be tried and punished by a legal body outside of the United States was too much for even many of the most globalist members of Congress.
In truth, the provision deterring ICC action on the part of Palestinian groups speaks to America’s overall attitude toward the court and what the ICC’s involvement would mean for the Middle East peace process.
A bit of context is required:
The source of the ICC mandate to try criminal cases stems from the international accord known as the Rome Statute of 1998. The statute established four broad categories of international crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the “crime of aggression.” Although the United States became a signatory of the statute in December 2000, the government pulled out of the treaty in 2002.
The idea that American military officers would be able to be tried and punished by a legal body outside of the United States was too much for even many of the most globalist members of Congress. In August 2002, just a few months after the government’s formal notice that it would not ratify the statute, Congress passed the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA), which contained a number of provisions, including authorization of the president to “use all means necessary and appropriate means to bring about the release of any US or allied personnel being detained by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court.”
That is toned down legal language for: If anyone tries to detain American or allied soldiers for trial in the ICC, we will consider it an attack against us, and we will fight back.
Indeed, the law preventing Palestinians from pursuing their grievances against Israel through The Hague is in line with the general policy sentiment espoused by the ASPA. In this sense the rule is not “obscure” at all, as some observers have commented, but very much part of the United States’ attitude toward international justice being meted out on America and its friends.
On the Palestinian end, the responses to the administration’s statements have been pretty high-handed. Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas promptly announced that all ties with the US were suspended.
Senior Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat scolded the US government, stating that “this is very unfortunate and unacceptable” and claiming that the decision is a result of “pressure being exerted” on the president and his administration by the Israeli government. “We are trying to achieve the ultimate deal” said Erekat, adding that such steps by American leaders will “undermine the whole peace process.”
While the Palestinian response to the administration’s decision is understandable, the closure of the PLO office in response to their ICC appeal was never a given, and was certainly not portrayed as an all-out diplomatic assault on the Palestinian leadership.
Even at the time of Tillerson’s original announcement, the secretary played down the implications of his own words. After iterating that the State Department was “unable to issue new certification” for the PLO office, the secretary was quick to add that “we are not cutting off relations with the PLO, nor do we intend to stop working with the Palestinian Authority.”
Despite Tillerson’s insistence that the closure of the PLO office would not sever US-Palestinian ties and the fact that in the end the State Department reversed its decision, observers have noted that the damage was done.
He assured the international community that US relations with the PLO and Palestinian Authority (PA) “extend well beyond contacts with the PLO office in Washington” and that America will always “remain focused on a comprehensive peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians that will resolve core issues between the parties.” The “measure” of closing the office, said Tillerson, should in no way indicate that the US was “backing off those efforts.”
There are two points to take away from this diplomatic conflict. Both of them highlight challenges in place for the US in being an effective peace moderator in the Middle East.
First is the growing sentiment among Palestinians that playing America’s game is a liability to their national aspirations, not an asset. Despite Tillerson’s insistence that the closure of the PLO office would not sever US-Palestinian ties and the fact that in the end the State Department reversed its decision, observers have noted that the damage was done. The threat to remove the PLO from the United States has made Palestinian leaders reconsider the desirability of staying in line with US policy.
This would of course not be the first time the Palestinians have come to this realization.
To cite a recent example, in 2012, Chairman Abbas went to the UN General Assembly to solicit Palestinian recognition after the US threatened a veto for such a move at the Security Council. Abbas was not willing to forego the opportunity to gain entrance into the UN just because of an American objection.
This event is unique, as the end result of an official office closing would be, in a way, a type of cutting off of relations with the US. But now the Palestinians are thinking, “Maybe we’re better off without an office in Washington.”
Point number two:
All of this shows just how serious the US is about maintaining control over Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and not allowing any arbitration to go to outside players. This may be a reflection of Trump wanting to be the man with complete dominion over a peace deal. More likely, it is a general reflection of the concern America has that the peace process might take a direction not congruent with its own interests.
Consider the fact that the leading party of the PA, Fatah, recently created a unified government with the militant group Hamas. No administration wants such a union coming into political independence outside of American patronage.
The aftermath of this political squabble will begin to demonstrate how much leverage Washington really maintains over Palestinian rulers, and how much leverage Palestinian leaders are willing to put up with.
