OpsLens

Russian Myths Informing a Dangerous Russian Policy – 75th Anniversary of Stalingrad

In late August, 75 years ago, the Battle of Stalingrad began. More than four million men fought in the battle and almost two million died. With rare exceptions, the Germans never mounted a serious counter attack after the battle, and many historians consider Stalingrad the turning point in the war. But this victory in the war has perpetuated Russian myths that inform and justify their aggressive behavior — it makes honest discussion about the conflict very difficult.

The Germans invaded Russia in the summer of 1941. After the Germans failed to capture Moscow in late 1941, they stabilized their lines and prepared for the knockout blow in 1942. Initially they did very well, they surged southwest throughout the Russian breadbasket and oil fields. By fall they reached Stalingrad, and both sides committed their forces.

By November, the Russians had (barely) held the west bank of the city; General Zhukov planned and launched a massive counter attack on the German flanks. The most effective German units were pushing towards the East side of the city, while lesser trained allied and German units held the flanks. The attack was wildly successful and the Russians surged across the front, trapping the German units in Stalingrad.

Outnumbered and surrounded, the Germans tried to break out, but withered and surrendered by February of 1943. The Soviet forces were so energetic in pursuing the Germans that General Manstein — the architect of the German victory over France — launched a counter attack around Karkov that surprised the Russians and limited their immediate gains. The German efforts after Stalingrad largely consisted of skillful withdraws and tenacious defenses until the end of the war.

Russian politicians forced the dismissal of the chief archivist for debunking a popular war time myth and some historians face jail time for criticizing the Red Army.

Stalingrad, or what the Russians call the Great Patriotic War, is part of a broader narrative in modern times. One in six Russians died, including Putin’s older brother.  The narrative of Russian sacrifice and victory over Hitler fuels the belief that they require a strong leader and army who are constantly vigilant along their buffer and border states.

Russians believe they have a right to prevent future suffering by intervening in the affairs of their neighbors and exerting control over territories near Russia. This is seen in the seizing of the Crimean Peninsula, the aide of separatists in Ukraine, and the threatening of the Baltic States. They see enemies around every corner, and are particularly worried about the expansion of NATO.

These behaviors also make discussing the war perilous. A televised discussion on the mismanagement of the war effectively shut down the Russian station. Russian politicians forced the dismissal of the chief archivist for debunking a popular war time myth and some historians face jail time for criticizing the Red Army.

Hitler and Germany should receive a good deal of blame for the devastation in Russia. But Stalin enabled the war, maximized the casualties of his people, and then discounted vital American and Western aid.  In 1939, they actively joined Germany in partitioning Poland. They stood by while Germany gobbled up Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and Romania.

Russia captured the Baltic States and launched a disastrous attack on Finland during the winter of 1940. The army’s performance was so poor that they essentially invited German invasion. Russia provided millions of tons of much needed grain, oil, and steel to the Germans, and literally fueled the German war machine for the first two years of the war. Stalin was so paranoid that he continued to send shipments up until the moment Hitler attacked.

Stalin purged, killed, and imprisoned many of his most competent generals in the years leading up to the war. His security forces killed five million Russians over subversive activity.  Russia and Germany were pariahs after World War I — they jointly cooperated as early as 1927, which allowed Germany to trade, remilitarize, and evade sanctions.

The Battle of Stalingrad itself didn’t have to be so costly. The city had relatively few natural resources and heavy industry, but a great deal of symbolic value to both sides. Stalin issued instructions that ordered “not one step back.” The inflexible tactics turned the conflict into a meat grinder for the Russian people, and caused as high as 80% casualty rates in some units. Moreover, the American Lend Lease program motorized the supply of Russian units.  The trucks made their counter attacks much more successful, while the struggling Germans still relied on horse drawn supplies.

The problem with history isn’t that most people forget and repeat it (as the cliché goes), but that they learn the wrong lessons. For example, Americans that support conflict tend to cite World War II, while Americans that oppose conflict cite Vietnam. Both of the wars were rather unique, but the lessons from those wars become short hand in foreign policy debates.

The Russians have similar short hand debates using their role in the Great Patriotic War. Contrary to their myths, the Russians do not have a unique claim to suffering, as they actually made much of it worse. A lesson that more faithfully applies history might suggest a need to avoid aggressive balance of power politics by a larger nation like Russia. Their aggression is causing neighbor countries to seek help from the U.S. and NATO — it might be creating the ring of hostile states that Russia fears.