Several months ago, the Defense Department delivered to Congress its annual report on the “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.” The 145-page document recently began attracting the attention of global media. And for good reason. The China report is essentially a detailed description of the administration view of PRC as a major adversary, and what specific dangers it poses to US interests.
The Breakdown
The report starts off by explaining the general strategic view of China’s leadership over the recent period. According to DoD, for the better part of two decades, Beijing has been focused on building up the country in order to compete as a global power. Since 2002, Chinese leaders—including President Xi Jinping—have characterized the opening of the 21st century as a “period of strategic opportunity.” They assess that international conditions during this time facilitated domestic development and the expansion of China’s “comprehensive national power.” The notion that the last eighteen years has been an opportune time for China—and indeed other United States adversaries as well—is not a new idea. Government analysts have long pointed to the War on Terror and other related conflicts as having taken up nearly all the US bandwidth on foreign policy. A pre-occupied America coupled with staggering economic growth (it was during this period that China firmly established itself as the second largest world economy) gave the country the means and circumstances to start planning big.
Seizing the opportunity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) distilled several objectives into President Xi’s “China’s Dream of national rejuvenation to establish a powerful and prosperous China.” The actual strategies to propel China into the future have been varied, although all present some type of combination of diplomatic and economic leverage. One important method has been establishing commercial interconnectivity in the region with Chinese infrastructure, embodied by the “Belt and Road Initiative,” or BRI. This project, incredible in size and scale, is intended to develop strong economic ties with other countries, “shape their interests to align with China’s” and perhaps more importantly, to deter confrontation or criticism of China’s approach to sensitive international issues. In this way, the Belt and Road project is a type of national insurance policy designed to insure cooperation from regional partners. Countries participating in BRI could develop economic dependence on Chinese capital, which China could then leverage to achieve its interests. For example, in July 2017, Sri Lanka and a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) signed a 99-year lease for Hambantota Port, following similar deals in Piraeus, Greece, and Darwin, Australia. Of course this influence can be used not only to spread Chinese economic infrastructure, but also its military presence. The Chinese naval base in Djibouti, opened almost exactly a year ago, is a recent example.
Which brings us to the main point that the Pentagon is interested in: China’s overall military strength.
According to the DoD report, all of China’s projecting of power into different regions has been the primary motivation for building up its armed forces. After all, China requires the means of securing all the interests its investing in. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the specific areas of growth for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA):
- A growing emphasis on the importance of maritime forces
- More advanced tools in the information/cyber domains
- Developing the ability for more effective offensive air operations and other “long-distance mobility attack
- Deploying military platforms in space
But developing specific capabilities is not the sum total of China’s defense ventures. Perhaps more important is Beijing’s renewal of the military’s managerial approaches. In the Pentagon’s words, the PLA is “undergoing the most comprehensive restructure in its history” to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning “informatized local wars,” a term referring to conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control, and precision strike. Reforms seek to streamline command and control structures and improve jointness at all levels. The direction of military reforms has been highlighted not only by which projects policymakers are investing in, but also by what they are cutting. Significant personnel cuts have targeted PLA Army (PLAA) personnel and re-diverting resources into other areas like the Navy, Airforce, and cyber units.
Efforts to make this image of China’s military into a reality have been well underway.
The Pentagon assesses China has already taken on several projects building space-based platforms. “Space operations are viewed as a key enabler of PLA campaigns aimed at countering third-party intervention.” One of its current ventures is the development of a “real-time surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system.” China has increased the number and capabilities of its space systems, including various “communications and intelligence satellites.” The report raises concerns about offensive systems as well, including counter-space weapons like kinetic-kill missiles, lasers and orbiting space robots.
One of the single most interesting topics of the DoD report was in regards to China’s Naval development. Last year, the Department exposed the shadowy People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), the third Chinese sea force along with the Navy and Coast Guard. In this year’s report, the Pentagon layed out how the PAFMM is used as an important tool for China in asserting control of disputed island areas in the South China Sea. As the report’s accompanying fact sheet stipulated “China […] is willing to employ coercive measures to advance its interests and mitigate other countries’ opposition” and that China has conducted “coordinated PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard (CCG), and PAFMM” operations to this end.
Training and planning to advance air capabilities in both range and efficiency are also reportedly underway. “Over the last three years, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has rapidly expanded its overwater bomber operating areas, gaining experience in critical maritime regions and likely training for strikes against US and allied targets,” the report said.
The Reception
Something that always needs to be taken into account when a government report on defense is published, is that Americans are not the only readers. The Chinese have access to the internet as well. Any congressional report on China is an advertisement to PRC on how policymakers view them. A response from Beijing was inevitable.
Last week, the China Daily, a Communist Party-owned newspaper, quoted a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, who said the United States “misinterprets China’s strategic intentions” with its military build up. Wu said China’s military modernization is only aimed at “safeguarding its sovereignty and security, as well as world peace and stability, and the military reform, weapons development and cyberspace defense are justifiable and reasonable.” Furthermore, Wu claimed that the whole institution of DoD’s annual report on China “harms the mutual trust” between the US and PRC and fosters a “Cold War mentality” among US policymakers.
“China has firmly taken the path of peaceful development and remained a contributor to world peace and international order,” Senior Colonel Wu Qian said, and its military has borne considerable international peacekeeping and disaster relief responsibilities, earning “universal praise from the international community.”
While some of the assertions of Colonel Qian are debatable (take for instance the implication that China’s military operations in the region have earned the country nothing but “international praise”), the general flavor of China’s official response is clear. Beijing saw the latest DoD report, with its rough language and methodical layout of potential threats posed by China, as a clear signal: Washington has an eerie concern about China and will likely take more concrete steps to mitigate what it sees as long-term dangers emanating from the country. The last thing China needs now with its vision of regional expansion and eventual dominance, is the United States becoming more of an obstacle than it already is. It would be overly simplistic to view the Ministry of Defense’s statement as merely an equal reaction to being lambasted by the US. There is a very clear desire for rapprochement, even achieving some diplomatic accord. China is trying to reassure the US that they’re not as dangerous as they think and hopes to create a “win-win” [sic] relationship with America.
The Road Ahead
Weather the DoD report “misjudged” China’s aims as Beijing claims, is yet to be determined. The question moving forward is: Does China actually care about staying on America’s (Trump’s) good side as their response strongly implies? Will they perhaps take steps to show their willingness to create that “win-win” scenario? Or will it be business as usual? Perhaps the administration will be able to test the waters, and see if Beijing is willing to partner with US interests in Asia and the broader region. The ongoing issues of the North Korean reconciliation and the future of Iran’s economic isolation, for instance, are current experiments that can demonstrate weather or not China is willing to play ball.
