“Based on recent Chinese conflicts, the strategic culture of the region, and the increasingly sophisticated means to carry it out, the next Pearl Harbor has a good chance of coming from a surprise attack of Chinese ballistic missile forces…”
Analysts often discuss China’s new technologies such as the new carrier killing missiles and advanced fighters like the J20, as well as their aggressive militarization of the South China Sea. As I’ve said previously in an OpsLens article, it’s important to note these developments but also have a rational assessment of them. When the War on the Rocks came out with a new article discussing China’s use of missiles in a possible preemptive strike, it proved to be both provocative and interesting. The author did a good job of describing how this strategy could counteract some of the preventive measures the US has adopted, and he used satellite data of practice sites compared to potential target sites to support his suggestion. One thing the article did not discuss is the historical and strategic heritage of the region, which makes the news of this possible strategy more concerning than just a new missile or carrier.
China’s history since the Communists won the civil war in 1949, is particularly concerning. Simply put, they have fought offensive preemptive wars with every one of their neighbors. Even though they were only one year removed from a devastating civil war, in 1950 they launched a preemptive sneak attack on American forces in Korea. A few years later they seized islands that belonged to Taiwan in what is now called the Taiwan Crisis. It was only the timely intervention of American forces in the Taiwan Strait that prevented China from seizing the rest of Taiwan.
Just a few years after that, China sought to readjust its borders with India in a short offensive strike in 1962. They targeted their allies, the Soviet Union, in 1969. In this case there was another border dispute; and the area was militarized by both sides when Chinese commandoes preemptively seized disputed islands in the Ussuri River (a preemptive seizure of disputed islands after the area was militarized should lend added weight to Chinese actions in the South China Sea). Finally, they fought a short but inconclusive war with Vietnam in 1979. Again, this was an offensive preemptive strike that ended with China confirming the transfer of key territory along its border.
In short, China has frequently fought offensive wars with each of its neighbors, utilizing a key strategic signature. They often initially assume a defensive posture, but then use preemptive offensive strikes at the operational and tactical level to achieve victory. While there are significant differences among East Asian powers, they share the historical tendency to use strategic surprise.
Japan used preemptive assaults to neutralize Western power. They struck Western fleets in the Russian Japanese War of 1904-1905, and of course there is the infamous assault at Pearl Harbor during World War II. While the Japanese army excelled in using their highly trained and well equipped armies for quick and preemptive strikes against their Chinese and Western enemies, they often had little strategy beyond that. You might even say they relied on shock and awe to win quick and decisive wars.
Their land army fighting Russia for example had begun to run out of steam when the war ended, and it relieved them of any further operations. The Chinese forces that fought the Japanese eventually learned to retreat in the face of Japanese thrusts, and counter attack at a time and location when the offensive almost literally ran out of gas. These offensive attacks from a generally defensive posture resulted in some rare Chinese victories, such as the Third Battle of Changsha in 1942. But an argument can be made that this stretches even further back in time. For example, there is a strain of preemptive thought going back to Sun Tzu’s admonition to “strike at enemy plans.”
This strategic reliance on quick and decisive preemptive thrusts means that each newer missile can better implement that strategy. The new carrier killing missile (DF21) for example has a range of 900 miles and reportedly travels at Mach 10, or 7,000 miles per hour. It can be armed with a war head that theoretically can kill a ship, such as a carrier, with a single shot.
Additionally, the Chinese are building assets like the new hyper sonic missile. It’s considered an air to air missile and is about 19 feet long with a range of about 300 miles. In addition to the added range, the most important feature of the missile is its larger radar system that allows it to better lock onto stealth targets. The missile would not be mounted on their stealth fighters such as the J20, as it is too big for that launch bay. But it can be flown on J16s in close support of the J20. Much like the F35 networking with older fighters (see below), the J20 would fly in the lead and use its more advanced sensors and forward positions to locate targets at which the trailing J16s would fire. In particular, this would target refueling ships, planes, and other softer targets that would limit the range and defense available to a carrier.
The combination of strategy and the new means to carry it out indicates that the US should have reason to worry. It’s important to keep in mind, though, that it is still difficult to hit a moving ship with half a dozen layers of anti-missile security. The US has a combat air patrol that is tasked with hunting and killing missile launching platforms before they can fire. They are even practicing networking with the F35 to increase the sensor range of older generation fighters. The next line of defense consists of Aegis ships with specialized radar and anti-missile weapons. These are being upgraded and have also been networked with the F35 to increase their range. The US is looking to repurpose old howitzers such as the Paladin and equip them with smart technology to intercept incoming missiles. The final layers of defense are the rail gun and close-in missile systems of ships.
All of this sounds well and good, but these are active defenses manned during a period of hostilities or deployment. A ship in port has few if little of these defenses. The Rand Corporation calculated that Chinese missiles could hit fixed targets in Japan within a few minutes of their being launched. This includes the key port of Yokoshura, Japan, the home of the US 7th fleet, and location of the navy’s only carrier in the region. China has shown that they are willing to launch preemptive attacks, and they continue to seize and build key military islands in the South China Sea.
In the event of a sneak attack the US would have little of its anti-missile defenses deployed or activated. Most of the US assets are being directed towards the South China Sea, and they would have little time to activate those with the 7th fleet in Japan. The US could start to take defensive measures such as deploying Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) systems and tasking the Aegis destroyers in the fleet with missile defense near the port, but that is not what is currently happening.
Many people want to talk about the next Pearl Harbor, and the idea of a dangerous sneak attack sparks conversation. Based on recent Chinese conflicts, the strategic culture of the region, and the increasingly sophisticated means to carry it out, the next Pearl Harbor has a good chance of coming from a surprise attack of Chinese ballistic missile forces. The US has existing defenses that are quite capable, but they are decidedly less effective in the event of a surprise, preemptive strike. There are some simple measures that the US can and should take to help lessen that risk.
Morgan Deane is an OpsLens Contributor and a former U.S. Marine Corps infantry rifleman. Deane also served in the National Guard as an Intelligence Analyst. He is the author of the forthcoming book Decisive Battles in Chinese history, as well as Bleached Bones and Wicked Serpents: Ancient Warfare in the Book of Mormon.
