When facing a superior force, it is best to adopt tactics that avoid direct engagement with an opposition that has overwhelming capabilities. Said another way: because it is highly unlikely that an individual can defeat a tank by standing in the open and firing a rifle, it is best for the weaker force to subvert conventional methodologies and implement “hit-and-run” procedures that increase the likelihood of success—psychological or physical damage with an increased chance for survival. These tactics are most often synonymous with guerilla warfare, asymmetric warfare, and terrorism. One ongoing example of an assimilation of these tactics is Chechnya. The Chechens integrated various terrorist practices from an influx of Islamic jihadists in order to fight against the dominant Russian forces that entered the area. Although the Chechens did not identify as ethnic Russians, they did not originally utilize terror tactics, nor did they harbor Islamic extremism beliefs. Instead, they turned to terrorism because of a combination of a desperate need to win and the assimilation of extreme Islamic practices from an increase of foreigners.
Chechnya is an ethnically defined republic in Russia—it is important because of its strategic location and resources. In between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea (east to west respectively), Chechnya is one of the southernmost Russian provinces in the Caucuses. It shares a border with Georgia (southwest). Along the southern border of Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Caucasus Mountains stretch in between the two seas. In addition to Chechnya’s key location, it is also mineral-rich. The difference between the Russian workers and the indigenous population caused a form of economic strain, which further separated the two ethnic groups. Despite a growing ethnic concern, Russia was not willing to cede Chechnya to the indigenous peoples because of the location and resources.
Although, the natural inhabitants of Chechnya differed from the Russians in their political structure, they were susceptible to change because their historic system was not able to sustain itself.
According to Richard Sakwa, “Chechen society is divided into clan-like teip structures, and although in some respects Chechnya is thoroughly modernized, it is simultaneously pre-modern. A teip is an extended kinship community (there are about 130 in Chechnya) consisting of family groups who can trace their origins to a single individual … [However], the wars have eroded the traditional role of the teip and, although their ‘elders’ (starosty) still have a role to play, they have been overshadowed by field commanders. Like many of the ‘quasi-states’ examined by Robert Jackson, Chechen society (even without Russian intervention) appears unable to sustain the weight of a modern state. The anarchic egalitarianism of a people unused to state authority refuses to subordinate itself even to its own legitimate authorities (except in time of war, and even then only partially and reluctantly). This was already strongly in evidence under Dudaev, compounded by his inability to decide what sort of state Chechnya should become: democratic market-oriented or Asiatic-statist (bureaucratic), retaining property in his grasp.”
As the culture eroded and the dominant Russian nationalist society continued to take from the land and decrease the opportunity that was available to the native population, the Chechens began to romanticize rebellion.
In 1991, Chechnya declared that it was going to leave Russia, which led to a battle that destabilized all the indigenous people. After three years of increased tension, Chechnya’s succession culminated in a war that ranged from roughly 1994-96. Almost 35,000 people were killed in the republic, close to a third of the population. The crushing defeat led to a forced diaspora that broke down the pre-existing social order. With the population devastated and unable to maintain its edifice, it became vulnerable to external influences.
Extreme Islamic ideology, from the influx of Jihadist Foreign Fighters (JFF) and a shift in political direction toward Islamic ideals, the sharia (Islamic religious law) began to shift Chechen culture toward terrorism. From about February 1995 forward, an increased foreign jihadist presence entered the Caucasus. The JFFs included a small number of raw young volunteers from Tajikistan, Kashmir, and Afghanistan; however, the majority came from the Arabian Peninsula, 59 percent from Saudi Arabia, 14 percent from Yemen, and 6 percent from Kuwait.
With many new Salafist Islamic idealist fighters entering the region, Chechnya became another version of Western oppression to Muslim culture. As the tide began to turn, in 1996, Chechen President Zelimkhan Yanderbaev declared Chechnya as an “Islamic” state and fostered the shift from a secular society to sharia law. As Chechnya became more Islamic, Chechen peoples began to conduct training in various terrorist camps. Shamil Basayey, an ethnic Chechen who was influenced by Islamic ideology, traveled to a jihadist training camp in Khost, Afghanistan, where he was exposed to the methods and ideology of the JFFs (i.e., bomb making), thus leading to the shift in tactics from force- on-force to terrorism.
The force without the tactical advantage (technology, weaponry, armament, etc.) will always loose to the superior force if it plays by the same rules with the same strategies. In the case of Chechnya, Russia simply outclassed them and devastated their entire population. It was a combination of utter defeat, forced diaspora, and the need for new methodologies that led the Chechens to assimilate Islamic ideals and switch to terrorism. Islamic extremism, in the form of Jihadist Foreign Fighters, simply offered both a tactical option, and more fighters who shared a rebellious ideal. Islam is not necessarily the true identity of the Chechens, but the romanticized ideal of rebellion along with the influx of fighters allowed the culture to easily assimilate terror tactics.
