Turkey’s invasion of Syria continues to wreak havoc on the war-torn country. Recently, it declared victory in its effort to take the northern city of Afrin. The Turkish flag was raised over the city after confirmation that all Kurdish forces had left. Turkey has now accomplished its initial objective. The question on the table now is what the long-term trajectory of Turkey’s strategy in the country will be. With the complexity of the conflicts and stakeholders present in Syria, there are several important factors Turkey’s leadership will have to consider moving forward, not the least of which is its relationship with other allies present in the country.
Turkey’s invasion has already become a major destabilizing factor in Syria. Ankara’s incursion across the border began nearly two months ago, when Turkish tanks rolled into Afrin in northern Syria in the first steps of an operation to dislodge US-backed People’s Protection (YPG) forces from the area. Since then, the thrust forward of the Turkish army has been unstoppable. According to reports, advancing forces quickly displaced 5,000 people and killed scores of civilians in the first few days of the operation.
Turkish Army leopard tanks conduct military operation “Olive Branch” in Afrin. (Credit: VOA/Wikimedia Commons)
The operation, ironically dubbed “Olive Branch,” drew intense criticism from US officials, including Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who told reporters that “the violence in Afrin disrupts what was a relatively stable area in Syria and distracts from the international effort to defeat Daesh.” Turkey was not perturbed.
Turkish forces expanded their offensive in Syria to the town of Manbij, about 100km directly to the east of Afrin. This took them to the edge of the US-backed Kurdish presence in the country’s northeast. This brought to the forefront the real possibility of a clash between US forces and the constantly advancing Turkish army, a risk that has not really abated since.
The inflammation Turkey added to the already ravaged region, along with the prospect of Turkish and US troops actually having to face off in Syria, amplified a pre-existing schism between Ankara and Washington. For years, the US and Turkey have been at odds on policy toward the Kurdish people and the role they play in the region. The US has seen the Kurds as a vital asset in the war against extremist elements in the region. As reliable and efficient fighters, the Kurds were indispensable in major battles such as the campaign to liberate Mosul in Iraq. In Syria as well, Kurdish units have provided vital assistance to coalition efforts, most notably in the recent liberation of the ISIS capital city, Raqqa. Turkey sees the Kurdish fighting groups as terror groups that threaten its sovereignty in key regions in the south and east of the country.
From this perspective, it is not surprising that Turkey has indicated that it plans to expand its Syria campaign even further. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan told a press conference on March 19 that Turkish troops and allied Syrian forces would press eastward, targeting territory that includes the town of Kobani, a location that has become a symbol of the fight against jihadists with a stake in the country such as the Islamic State, as well as the town of Qamishli, where the Syrian government controls an airport and a security zone.
Another potential target is the town of Manbij, a location 34km from the Turkish border. US and Kurdish forces are jointly responsible for security in Manbij, a fact which further raises the concern of confrontation between American and Turkish forces. Erdogan even threatened to target Iraq’s Sinjar mountains, a long mountainous ridge a few kilometers from Syria’s border used by Kurdish fighters to move between the two countries and transport equipment, munitions, and men.
Kurdish YPG fighters. (Credit: Wikimedia Commons)
In other words, now that Turkey has committed its forces to Syria, it intends to go all the way in rooting out Kurdish strongholds in all of Northern Syria, and perhaps in the broader region.
In truth, however, Turkey’s war cries may be more like empty threats than actual implementable battle plans. Kurdish fighting groups such as the YPG have responded to Erdogan’s statements, and have made it clear that they have no intention of backing down, despite their setback in Afrin. Othman Sheikh Issa, co-chair of the Afrin executive council, said in a televised statement on March 18, “[Our] forces will strike the positions of the Turkish enemy and its mercenaries at every opportunity.” The Turkish takeover of Afrin did not really represent a defeat of the Kurdish defenders, but rather their strategic withdrawal. As Issa told listeners in the same statement, “Our forces are present all over Afrin’s geography.”
The fact that international media outlets reported that Afrin fell to the Turks with barely a shot fired, also confirms that the Kurds in the region have not been vanquished but, on the contrary, are waiting to fight another day on more favorable terms. Indeed YPG leadership has made clear they intend to change their strategy in combating invading Turkish forces. Militants will shift from direct confrontation to guerrilla tactics in their battles against the Turkish military. As the Kurds have years of experience under their belts waging an insurgency in southern Turkey and other places, taking more territory from YPG may be an impractical long-term strategy.
As Ozgur Ünlühisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund think-tank put it, Turkey’s threat to expand the military operation would be “very difficult” to carry out, practically speaking. According to Ünlühisarcikli, Erdogan’s statements have been put out as merely a bargaining chip, aimed at threatening other nations and pushing them into cutting off all cooperation with the Kurds, or risk being caught in the crossfire of a Turkish-Kurdish shootout.
The Syrian Democratic Forces announce an offensive north of Deir ez-Zor. (Credit: VOA/Wikimedia Commons)
Another risk Turkey faces if it continues to expand its Syrian incursion may be having to confront Syrian government forces. Although the regime has had its hands tied for years just weathering the storm of the civil war, relatively recent factors such as substantial Russia support have freed up Syrian military assets. Last month, a large contingent of Syrian forces left Aleppo to join up with Kurdish forces in Afrin in what state-run Syrian TV said was an initiative to help “defend our people against the Turkish aggression.” Due to the quick retreat of YPG units and the subsequent speedy takeover of Afrin, there was never really a battle in which Turks had to face Syrians. However, the danger of a clash between Assad and Erdogan still lurks, which would add yet another dimension to the conflict in Syria.
Ultimately, the extent of the consequences triggered by Turkey’s campaign in Syria will depend on how far the government in Ankara is willing to commit. On this point there have been some mixed messages. On the one hand, Erdogan has made clear his willingness to go all the way. The Turkish president went so far as to threaten declaring war against Syria’s ruling Assad regime if Syrians interfered with their campaign against the Kurds.
Conversely, Turkish leaders have also tried to reach out to their Syrian counterparts in an attempt to mitigate the effects of Turkey’s presence in the country. Erdogan’s spokesman, Ibrahim Kalin told reporters a few weeks ago that Turkish intelligence officials “may establish direct or indirect contact when it is required to solve certain problems under extraordinary conditions.” This statement from Erdogan’s administration really underscores the conflicting sides of Turkey’s considerations in Syria. While Turkey may have a substantial security need to eliminate Kurdish enclaves in Syria, the complex reality of the Syrian war zone, with its layers of collaborations and the varying interests of all the parties involved, curtails any one party from operating with complete freedom. Turkey understands this, and therefore seeks to achieve the maximum amount of progress in disabling its Kurdish enemy, without triggering a response from any other player.
Even if Turkey manages to avoid all direct confrontation with other stakeholders in Syria, it is unavoidable that its actions will have substantial consequences for the broader conflict in the country. One of the more troubling consequences is taking the pressure off of ISIS in eastern Syria by drawing Kurdish fighters away from key areas in order to meet the Turkish advance. This more than anything else may prove to be a key factor in increased US opposition to Turkey’s current campaign.
