The long and often strange story of North Korea’s reconciliation with the United States treks on. As this story continues to unfold, the barriers standing before a lasting peace between Pyongyang and the West become more apparent every day.
To be sure, there has been a significant amount of progress made in soothing the diplomatic triad that connects North and South Korea and the US. Much of this progress would have been considered wishful thinking by many just a few months ago. Despite the slew of seemingly insurmountable issues, diplomats from all these countries adamantly sought incremental, small wins, often not knowing what their efforts might actually trigger—something Nietzsche captured in his call for “occasional will to stupidity.”
The first steps forward were modest. Back in January, international outlets reported that North Korea agreed to send athletes and cheerleaders to the Winter Olympics in South Korea after the two countries ended a series of official meetings. These talks were the first official interactions between the two countries in more than two years. No one had any illusions on the relatively low significance of this “breakthrough.” The cautious agreement was presented by diplomats as a small yet significant accord in cooling months-long tensions that had been consistently stoked by North Korean weapons testing and American military threats.
Next came North Korea’s invitation to South Korean president Moon Jae-in to visit Pyongyang. The invite, presented by Kim Yo Jong, the younger sister of North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un, was delivered during a historic meeting between North and South Korean officials at Seoul’s presidential palace in February. The meeting itself was the most significant diplomatic encounter between North and South Korea in recent memory. The younger Kim’s trip to the South marked the first time a member of the North’s ruling family visited the country since the Korean War 65 years ago.
On May 10, President Trump announced that he and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would meet face-to-face. Trump informed the world via Twitter: “The highly anticipated meeting between Kim Jong Un and myself will take place in Singapore on June 12th,” Trump tweeted. “We will both try to make it a very special moment for World Peace!”
The summit, which was in the works since Trump accepted Kim’s invitation to meet in March, would be the first ever meeting between a sitting US president and a North Korean leader. Recent visits to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo helped foment the meeting as well as bring about the long-anticipated release of three American citizens being held hostage in North Korea. Commenting on the secure arrival of the trio to the US, Trump publicly thanked dictator Kim for the gesture. “I think he wants to do something and bring that country into the real world,” Trump said.
Moving past formalities to concrete actions, Pyongyang made good on its April 27 pledge during an inter-Korean summit to close its Punggye-ri nuclear testing site located in North Hamgyong Province. Almost two weeks ago, commercial satellite photos were the first signs that North Korea is taking steps to scale down its nuclear program. According to experts, the images indicate that surface-level support structures of the facility are being dismantled.
One imagery analyst was quoted by Reuters as saying that “this would be consistent with the site being closed, as you need engineers and working teams on-site to prepare and maintain the site.” Other facilities appear to have been completely razed, including an engineering office, as well as buildings housing the important air compressor used to pump air into the tunnels where test explosions occur.
This development, like early ones, should not trigger any misplaced enthusiasm. The fact that North Koreans are taking apart their test site doesn’t mean the country is getting rid of its nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, many observers have reacted skeptically to Pyongyang’s move to deactivate Punggye-ri. A number of analysts have been quick to cite the example of 2008, when Pyongyang publicly dismantled parts of its uranium reprocessing plant but kept developing its nuclear program.
On top of this, the issue of America’s security commitments to South Korea recently came up as an impediment to moving forward the diplomatic process. This was an eventuality. The small army the United States has stationed on North Korea’s southern border has always been the biggest point of contention with the communist state. To put things into a bit of context, the connection the United States maintains with the region is essentially a layover from the Korean War, at the conclusion of which it invested heavily to keep communist infringement at bay in the North.
After six decades of gradual build-up, the US military maintains a force of nearly 30,000 personnel in South Korea under the command of United States Forces Korea (USFK), a subunit of United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). These men and women made up of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines are stationed on a network of a dozen bases scattered throughout the country’s north. This force is meant to be both a security guarantor and a deterrent against North Korean aggression in one of the most tense border regions in the world.
As part of its resolute commitment to maintaining South Korea’s security in the face of aggression from the North, the US conducts regular drills with South Korean forces. The rather elaborate ROK-US spring exercises that occurs annually was called out by North Korea earlier this week as a “provocation” and the reason the country’s leaders nixed a summit scheduled to take place on Wednesday with the South.
On May 18, media sources reported that the United States would scrap an upcoming exercise of ROK-US drills involving B52 bombers. This was indeed a powerful concession made to North Korea. The president has made his “maximum pressure” stance clear on multiple occasions. But this move showed that the administration also knows how to be giving as well. This is in step with other moves by Trump’s cabinet, such as Pompeo’s offer of economic assistance and security assurances.
Some Trump opponents took the opportunity to lambaste the president for giving in to a dictator. The thrust of their position is that the cancellation sent a signal of weakness in the face of North Korean threats. While the underlying logic is correct, namely that concessions for tyrants are counterproductive, this criticism is a bit extreme.
North Korea has made concrete steps in the past months to come toward the international community. They’ve met with South Korean leaders. They are destroying elements of their nuclear program. They released the three hostages. There is no reason why the United States cannot reciprocate these actions by showing gestures of reconciliation as well. To be clear, this argument should not be seen as engaging in apologetics on behalf of North Korea. This move was good for the US because it was in step with advancing its interests. Those interests include achieving maximum cooperation from Pyongyang and keeping the region stable for the long term.
Furthermore, any talk of the US backing away from security commitments to an ally by canceling the exercise is also out of place. Indeed, the request of the South Koreans themselves was the main factor in deciding to forego the exercise. No one is more interested in reaching peace with Pyongyang than Seoul, the actor most endangered by North Korea. It is not surprising that South Korea began scrambling to contain the effects of the North’s decision to pull out of the upcoming talks and to reassure Kim and his cohorts that Seoul is also willing to compromise.
All of this highlights the delicate nature of maintaining the path that still lies ahead. It will involve a balancing act of a show of strength—by both South Korea and America—as well as reassuring North Korea its intentions are fair and genuine.
