Last August, the Trump administration announced its new policy program for succeeding in Afghanistan. The new plan featured several innovations in strategy that surprisingly had not been implemented previously.
There were clear merits in implementing all of these new tactics. The practical experience-driven input of Trump’s Defense Secretary James Mattis played the most important role in reassessing the Afghanistan strategy and introducing fresh, new plans. With all of these changes, it behooves any honest observer of American foreign policy to take a sober look at Afghanistan’s state.
To put it bluntly, the situation on the ground has not been good. A province by province assessment of Afghanistan’s precarious security status can be laid out by piecing together international media reports as well as statements from the Taliban and other militant groups in the country.
Paktika
Earlier this month, reports confirmed that the Matta Khan district in Paktika Province experienced an uptick of Taliban attacks. The Taliban forced the closing of all schools in Matta Khan after it issued warnings that the buildings were being used for government activities including preparations for the national elections.
Badakhshan
According to local news reports, the Taliban succeeded in launching a series of attacks in the Tashkan district of Badakhshan. One of the more recent incidents involved the raiding of a police station which resulted in 20 officer casualties and three policemen kidnapped.
An Afghan Army soldier takes position during an operation against Taliban fighters in Badakhshan province.(Credit: Facebook/Afghan Army)
Kunduz
All of the districts in Kunduz are currently contested by the Taliban. A strong indication of just how tight of a grip the organization has on the province came in April when the Taliban ordered the 500-plus schools in Kunduz to close. The overwhelming majority of institutions—some 75 percent—were forced to abide by the edict.
Helmand
The security situation throughout Helmand has been rapidly deteriorated ever since the bulk of US forces left Afghanistan in 2014. The Taliban currently has complete control over seven of Helmand’s 13 districts (Baghran, Dishu, Kajaki, Musa Qala, Naw Zad, Reg or Khanshin, and Sangin). The other six districts (Nad Ali, Lashkar Gah, Nahri Sarraj, Nawa-I- Barak Zayi, Washer, and Garmser) are contested. Many Taliban bases have operated in the region over the past several years—they have considerable freedom to move within the area. Considering the low capabilities of Afghan forces in the province, these bases are still believed to be operational.
Ghazni
Over the past several weeks, the eastern province of Ghazni has experienced increased encroachment from the Taliban. On 20 May, the Taliban claimed it overran the Ajristan area after laying siege to the district center for several days. Ajristan was the second district in Ghazni to be overrun by the Taliban in the course of a week.
Kandahar
As one of the more infamous of Afghanistan’s provinces, and where the Taliban movement originated, many of Kandahar’s districts are still contested by the militants. Practically speaking, this means that while the central government is the official authority and has a presence in these places, Afghanistan’s military does not maintain full control over these areas. The Taliban has released video footage of them seizing Afghan army bases in these territories, with fighters flaunting their control, knowing full well that authorities are incapable of mounting responses. In other instances, the Taliban has been able to parade their units through the streets in broad daylight, as government forces do not have enough control to prevent even such blatant actions. As of last year, the Taliban claimed to control five of Kandahar’s 18 districts (Ghorak, Miyanashin, Registan, Shorabak, and Maruf) and heavily contest four more (Arghastan, Khakrez, Maiwand, and Shahwalikot).
In addition to the broader security situations of the above provinces, the Afghan Ministry of Defense recently identified seven provincial centers under serious threat from Taliban forces. They include Farah City, Faizabad in Badakhshan, Tarin Kot in Uruzgan, Kunduz City, Maimana in Faryab, and Pul-i-Khumri in Baghlan.
If the above data paints somewhat of an accurate picture, it means that some 240 of the 407 districts in Afghanistan are currently being actively contested or completely dominated by the Taliban. In other words, the government does not have control over most of the country.
September 2017: “The Taliban has shut down dozens of clinics in the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan in the past few days, officials said, amid demands for special treatment for its fighters who control most of the embattled region.” (Credit: Facebook/NewsZone.TV)
Meanwhile, US government sources are painting a rosy picture of the progress being made in Afghanistan. In a 20 May press release, the Department of Defense declared that “breathtaking” progress has been achieved by the Afghan military at rooting out the Taliban. Senior officials of the American operation in the country, Resolute Support, went so far as to state that this upper-hand position could be used to leverage the Taliban to negotiate with the government. This assessment is simply ignoring the facts.
At a press conference a few weeks ago, a Pentagon spokesman was actually posed with the question how her department can be so optimistic in light of the situation on the ground. One reporter recently asked: “But it’s still the case that the Taliban can attack at will major population [and] provincial centers…how is this a tremendous improvement?” Dana White, the assistant to Secretary Mattis on public affairs answered by saying that the Taliban are “desperate” and are only hitting “soft targets” such as “polling places.” This statement is simply wrong and has been for some time.
To be fair to the US and it’s coalition partners, it is still relatively early in the game. The new policy and strategy shifts in Afghanistan were announced less than ten months ago. With the time it took for logistics, troop movements, and implementation to get off the ground, we’re looking at a very young operation. Afghanistan is a countrywide conflict. All six hundred thousand square kilometers of the nation are enveloped in war. Even with the right strategy in place, it will not be an overnight effort to bring normalcy to the country. It will take time. With the “quick fix” mentality that pervades American political discourse, this might be a difficult idea for many to swallow.
This point is highlighted even more when considering that the underlying goal of the US in Afghanistan is fundamentally a long-term mission, namely to make the Afghan government independent in dealing with their own security problems. This simple strategy shift is what largely lies at the base of the current administration’s scope.
In truth, this was an effort given significantly less focus in earlier years of the war. American advisors had been assigned to Afghan military units, but typically only at the large-scale level. US personnel would oversee divisions, advise, and train them. Only special forces would receive something resembling one-to-one instruction on the ground in operational settings. As Mattis mentioned at a press hearing earlier this year, “The Afghan Special Forces that have had mentors basically always win, when they’re in the fights. They always win, to the point they’ve been probably, again, in that case, overused. So our point is to make their general purpose force more capable.”
Afghan Special Forces. (Credit: Facebook/Afghan Army)
While the persistent success of Afghan commandos is impressive and has been strategically important, a military is not built on these units. Special operations forces are the razor blades, the standard army is the broadsword. Units that have needed to face the Taliban in the more important large-scale battles for territory have been the regular battalions of the Afghanistan Army. This was the basis for the program currently being implemented, to ensure that regular units will receive the one-to-one training that, until now, only a fraction of Afghan personnel has received. But revamping the basic units of the Afghan military—which means equipping and training its troops to professional standards capable of taking on the highly experienced and highly motivated Taliban—will be a long-haul job. The six months since this program was announced is hardly a time frame to judge its success.
The international media has recently begun to highlight the tenuous situation in Afghanistan, backed by reports of the inspector generals at the Pentagon, State Department, and US Agency for International Development. Despite these observations, disappointing as they are, they should be put into context. Afghanistan has been engulfed in war for 17 years. Most of that time, the US-led coalition has been hobbled by self-imposed restrictions. Trump’s Afghanistan strategy still has hope to succeed, as long as resolve can be maintained.
