As Qatari mediators seek an end to the war between the United States and Iran, one question deserves more attention: If a new agreement lifts sanctions, releases frozen assets and finances reconstruction, who will control the money? Will it help ordinary Iranians, or strengthen institutions involved in domestic repression and regional confrontation?
This is not an argument against peace. Iranians urgently need an end to the fighting. But economic relief without safeguards could reinforce the very power structure that helps perpetuate conflict.
A $300 billion reconstruction plan
The 14-point memorandum signed by Donald Trump and Masoud Pezeshkian back on June 17, 2026, contained substantial economic provisions. Article 6 called for a reconstruction and development plan worth at least $300 billion, involving the United States and regional partners. Other provisions addressed sanctions relief, oil exports and frozen assets.
That figure was not a promise to hand Tehran $300 billion. Financing arrangements were to be settled later. Yet Article 11 allowed released assets to be paid to beneficiaries designated by Iran’s Central Bank. Although the memorandum contemplated oversight of implementation, it offered no explicit guarantees of independent audits, transparency about ultimate beneficiaries or protections against diversion to military and security bodies.
That omission matters because Iran’s military economy is not separate from its political system. The issue is not whether Iranians deserve reconstruction; they plainly do. It is whether the machinery distributing assistance can be independently scrutinized.
The military economy survives
An Oct. 29 Reuters investigation identified more than 5,000 entities linked to Iran’s Defense Ministry involved in obtaining military equipment and dual-use goods through intermediaries and foreign companies. One entity alone imported roughly $2.3 billion in goods between January 2025 and June 2026. Reuters also reported links between parts of this network and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and influential economic foundations.
The investigation does not prove every transaction was illegal or that every supplier knew the goods’ ultimate use. It does reveal extensive procurement capabilities despite war, blockade and sanctions.
Meanwhile, Iranian families struggle with soaring costs for food, healthcare and education. Economic pressure on civilians has not necessarily diminished the military establishment’s resources at the same rate. Opening new financial channels without identifying who ultimately benefits could deepen that imbalance.
More than corruption
Iran’s security institutions do more than defend its borders. They also help control society and suppress dissent. This is not primarily a struggle between supposedly peace-minded and pro-war factions. Rather, it reflects a governing structure in which political survival, domestic coercion and the ability to confront foreign adversaries are closely connected.
Repression constrains public opposition, while external crises enable authorities to portray protest as collaboration with foreign enemies. Even a welcome ceasefire does not automatically break that cycle.
Peace abroad, executions at home
In May, Amnesty International reported that more than 6,000 people had been arbitrarily detained in Iran since the war began on Feb. 28. It warned of torture, forced confessions, rushed trials and politically motivated executions. On Oct. 13, Amnesty reported that five people convicted in connection with January protests had been executed within one week after grossly unfair trials.
These reports raise a question that negotiations cannot ignore: Does peace mean only stopping military strikes, or should it also address the safety of Iranians seeking basic rights?
Three safeguards for a durable agreement
First, reconstruction financing should be tied to identifiable civilian projects, with independent audits of contracts, spending and ultimate beneficiaries. Hospitals, public services and essential infrastructure should benefit Iranians without enriching repressive institutions.
Second, efforts to disrupt illicit military procurement must be targeted. Legitimate commerce and access to food and medicine should be protected. Further impoverishing Iranian families while specialized military networks remain intact would defeat the humanitarian purpose of relief.
Third, the peace process should establish measurable human-rights benchmarks: a halt to politically motivated executions, the release of people imprisoned for peaceful activity and an end to using national-security charges to silence dissent.
Such safeguards would also give American taxpayers and regional partners a way to assess whether promised relief actually serves civilians rather than entrenched institutions.
Washington cannot determine Iran’s political future; that belongs to Iranians. But it can insist that economic provisions be transparent and that a peace process not overlook the relationship between massive repression, financing and regional security.
The Islamic Republic may sign a ceasefire and accept economic concessions without changing the institutions that sustain confrontation. Meanwhile, ending the war and rebuilding Iran are urgent goals – but neither should grant unchecked financial discretion to bodies unaccountable to the public.
The next deal’s essential question is not simply how much money will be released. It is who will control it, and whether the Iranian people will finally benefit.
